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THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER

A REVIEW OF SOVIET WRITING
ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA



PRICE SEVEN SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

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THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER

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MIDDLE EAST

The USSR and the Middle East Countries in 1961 reviews the development of the Soviet attitude towards the regimes of the various Middle East countries during 1961.

The Middle East in the Soviet Press includes the first direct Soviet comment on the new regime in Syria, and Soviet reports of reaction in Middle East countries to the CPSU Congress.

AFRICA

Soviet Views on Nigeria examines Soviet views of conflicting "reactionary" and "progressive" forces in Nigerian politics and in the Nigerian trade union movement.

Africa in the Soviet Press includes Soviet reports on the visit of President Brezhnev to the Sudan, and on developments in the Congo and Algeria.

THE USSR AND THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES IN 1961

The following notes are intended to show how Soviet views on the various political regimes in the Middle East countries have been presented in Soviet writing during 1961.

The UAR

Developments in the UAR do not yet seem to have changed the Soviet view that the UAR regime is not sufficiently "democratic", and that its internal policies are not "socialist" in the true sense of the word. At the same time the ideological differences between the two countries, which came into the open in a public dispute this summer, have not in the Soviet view affected the bases for Soviet-UAR cooperation in the economic sphere and Soviet-UAR solidarity on leading issues of foreign policy.

During 1960 reports on anti-Communism in the UAR were largely absent from the Soviet press, although the matter received considerable attention in the Communist press outside the Soviet Union. Early in 1961, however, Soviet newspapers began to quote non-Soviet Communist newspapers on the subject, including the DAILY WORKER (TRUD 5.2.61) for a denunciation of the "bloody slaughter" in Egyptian concentration camps, and the Italian Communist organ UNITA (PRAVDA 20.1.61) on the "contradictory nature" of Nasir's policy in calling for struggle against imperialism in Africa and Asia and at the same time imprisoning "the best Egyptian patriots and fighters against imperialism".

A landmark in the Soviet-UAR relations during 1961, at least from the UAR point of view, was the visit to the Soviet Union of a UAR parliamentary delegation headed by Anwar as-Sadat, President of the UAR National Assembly, from 28th April to 12th May. The Soviet press only reported general agreement of views between the Soviet leaders and their UAR guests. In particular, Khrushchev's reception of the delegation in the Kremlin on 3rd May was only very briefly reported in PRAVDA, without any account of the speeches made. At this reception, however, according to an account of it broadcast by Cairo radio (9.6.61), Khrushchev criticized the UAR attitude towards Communism:

> "We are Communists and you are not connected with this word. But history will teach you ... If our people live better than you under the Communist banner, then how can you declare yourselves averse to Communism? The people will say to you: Get out, we shall run our own affairs ... You say that you seek socialism. But you do not know much about the socialism which leads to Communism ... If you want socialism, then you must not say that

you are averse to Communism. You are placing yourselves in a critical position and have fallen into the imperialist trap."

In a letter to Khrushchev, sent after his return to the UAR, Anwar as-Sadat defended the UAR's concept of Arab nationalism and its "socialist cooperative ideas"; the UAR's rejection of capitalism, he said, did not mean that Communism, however successful in other countries, could be successfully applied in the UAR.

On 20th May, eight days after the UAR delegation's return to Cairo, TRUD reported that Riyad at-Turk, a member of the Syrian Communist Party, had died in prison in Damascus "as a result of savage torture". In fact Riyad at-Turk was alive and in good health; the UAR protested to the Soviet Ambassador about the false report, and press correspondents were allowed to see the man in prison (Cairo radio 23.5.61 and 5.6.61), as TRUD finally acknowledged (13.6.61). PRAVDA (31.5.61) then claimed that Farajallah al-Hilu, Secretary-General of the Lebanese Communist Party, had died in a Syrian prison as a result of torture, and a campaign of protests by Soviet organizations began. The UAR reply to this was that no such person had been imprisoned in the UAR.

At the same time PRAVDA (31.5.61) complained of anti-Soviet articles in the UAR press, and retorted with an outburst about the "socialist society" in the UAR - "a society in which exploiters rule and people make speeches about democracy, while for their political beliefs progressive people languished in torture chambers". The PRAVDA article evoked a storm of indignant comment in the UAR press and broadcasts, which denounced "the Soviet propaganda machine" not only for this article but for earlier attacks on the UAR. It was claimed that the Soviet attacks were directed, firstly, against the unity of the two UAR regions (since unity had meant the suppression of the Communist Party in Syria), and, secondly, against the UAR's policy of independent neutrality (the dispute coincided with the launching of the preparatory conference of non-aligned countries in Cairo, to which the first Communist reaction was one of marked reserve). To all this PRAVDA (17.6.61) replied with a long article complaining that the Soviet attitude had been represented and reaffirming Soviet friendship for the UAR, while at the same time leaving no doubt that the fate of Communists such as Farajallah al-Hilu in the UAR would remain a matter of Soviet concern. Thereafter the public dispute died down. The Soviet reader, however, was subsequently reminded of the fate of Farajallah al-Hilu when AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA of September 1961 published a "requiem" written in his memory by the Egyptian poet Najib Surur.

Nothing that has been published in the Soviet press since the dispute suggests that the Soviet Union is beginning to take a more favourable view of the UAR ideal of "a cooperative democratic socialist society",

which Soviet writers continue to refer to with sarcasm. Thus I.Belyayev, in a description of Cairo (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.8 of 1961), states:

> "Al-Azhar is now the stronghold of Muslim conservatism and anti-Communism. The periodicals issued here open with articles attacking materialism and everything progressive. Together with the Quran the students of Al-Azhar in the big courtyard of the university mosque also cram themselves with the official philosophy of 'cooperative democratic socialism'."

Belyayev emphasizes the "capitalist" aspects of the Egyptian economy:

> "From time to time the newspapers publish the annual accounts of banks, industrial companies and commercial firms. The profits frequently exceed 20 per cent - a level unknown in many highly developed capitalist countries. Among the former officers who in 1952 took part in the overthrow of Faruq the first 'nouveaux riches' have appeared. Some of them are almost millionaires."

Working class poverty is a main theme of Belyayev's article, and it is noticeable that he avoids all mention of the UAR Government's attempt to raise social standards, except in the field of education.

The recent far-reaching measures of nationalization, land reform and state economic control introduced in the UAR have only been briefly reported in the Soviet press, and the only considered comment on them hitherto appeared in a dispatch by PRAVDA's special correspondent V. Mayevskiy (24.8.61). Mayevskiy said that the people of the UAR hoped that these measures would mean "strengthening the national economy and the state sector, a weakening of the dictates of large private capital, a further attack on the position of large landowners, an improvement in the life of the national masses", and, in short, "some step towards socialism". Although, in Mayevskiy's view, the steps taken were "far from building socialism", this was not to minimize the importance of President Nasir's decrees. However, the realization of the people's hopes could be defeated by the attempts of reactionary forces to "put a spoke in the wheel".

Syria

During the first two months after the secession of Syria from the UAR no direct Soviet comment on the matter was published in the Soviet press. A scrupulous impartiality was observed in Soviet reporting of President Nasir's speeches on the one hand and Syrian statements on the other. However, this did not inhibit the Soviet press from publishing Syrian Communist Party statements applauding the Syrian people's "victory" and

calling for a "national front". Khalid Bakdash's denunciation of the previous regime in Syria, in his speech at the CPSU Congress, was duly reported in PRAVDA. Khrushchev, in a speech at the Congress, made a brief reference to Soviet relations with the new Syrian regime: "We shall develop businesslike cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic." An interesting point in Khalid Bakdash's speech was his allegation that Soviet economic projects in Syria had been "held up" under the former regime:

> "The Syrian people insists on the execution of projects provided for in the Syrian-Soviet agreement of 1957. If its realization, held up through no fault of the Soviet Union, were begun in due course, then the whole face of Syria would be changed."

Khalid Bakdash's strictures on the activities of Right-wing elements in Syria, after he was refused permission to re-enter the country, were reported in PRAVDA (24.11.61). On 28th November PRAVDA published an analysis of the political situation in Syria on the eve of the elections, which reviewed the prospects for the restoration of "democratic liberties" in Syria (see below, "The Middle East in the Soviet Press").

Iraq

Agitation by the world Communist movement on behalf of Communists allegedly persecuted by the Iraqi authorities began towards the end of 1960 and continued during the first half of 1961. It received notable support in the Soviet press and from Soviet organizations, which sent protests to Gen. Qasim. The main subjects of complaint were the suppression of the Communist newspaper ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B and the prosecution of its editor, the alleged falsification of trade union elections and the imprisonment of trade unionists, and the sentences passed on participants in the Mosul disturbances of spring 1959.

For the most part, the protests cast no aspersions on the character of the Iraqi Government itself. A letter to Qasim from the World Federation of Trade Unions, however (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 11.2.61), stated:

> "Astonishingly, but involuntarily, the question arises: are those forces which oppose imperialism and feudalism to be unable any more to make their contribution to the building of the Iraqi state, which without this contribution will be exposed to the pressure of the foreign monopolies?"

Similar misgivings were expressed on the Soviet account in a NEW TIMES article (No.14 of 1961):

> "Recently tension has mounted to such an extent that those who would see Iraq a democratic and independent peacable state cannot but feel concerned. For the news coming from there indicates that the patriotic and democratic elements in the country are being persecuted and sentenced to death, that the reactionaries are once more rampant."

Little material on Iraq has been published recently either in the Soviet daily press or in periodicals. The last reference to internal conditions in the country was an article by P. Donskoy (AFRIKA I AZIYA SEGODNYA No.7 of 1961) deploring the suppression of the "democratic press" in Iraq. Donskoy expressed sympathy with the Baghdad taxi-men who went on strike in March 1961 and described in lurid terms the suppression of the demonstrations: "The streets of Baghdad became red with the blood of workers." On the general situation in Iraq, Donskoy observed:

> "The position of the patriots becomes more complicated as each day passes. The wave of reactionary poison has spread throughout the whole country. Inveterate reactionaries and the dregs of society ... have crawled out from dark corners and gateways."

On two matters of domestic policy, agrarian reform and the oil question, the Soviet view is that the Iraqi Government has not gone far enough. On agrarian reform, PRAVDA's Baghdad correspondent Demchenko (SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No.1 of 1961) points out that by September 1963, when the distribution of land must be completed under the existing law, only a little more than a third of needy peasants will have received land. Reviewing an ITTIHAD ASH SHA'B article on Iraq's land reform measures, N.A. Arsharuni (VOPROSY ISTORII No.5 of 1961) notes that these do not provide for the confiscation of the land of "traitors who previously collaborated actively with the imperialists", and adds:

> "The author of the article is also alarmed by the fact that many officials who earlier collaborated actively with the imperialists are still serving in the state apparatus. In a number of cases these officials deliberately impede the implementation of the reform or distort its character."

The Iraqi Government's oil policy was subjected to a detailed and critical examination in a long article by Yu.N. Andreyev (PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No.1 of 1961). The main burden of this was that "the enslaving concession agreement of 1952" had still not been revised, two and a half years after the revolution; the Iraqi Government was not sufficiently radical in its demands, whereas the Iraqi Communists had

put forward a programme on the oil question which truly reflected the nation's needs.

The Kurdish question has not been referred to in the Soviet press, if one excepts the short mention of it by the Iraqi delegate Salam Adil at the CPSU Congress (PRAVDA 25.10.61):

> "The Arabs and the Kurds /are/ even more convinced of the necessity of strengthening their joint struggle for democracy against imperialist plots aimed at the disruption of the nationalist ranks, against the policy of repression and persecution of the Kurdish people of Iraq."

The Kurdish disturbances in northern Iraqi have not been reported in the Soviet press.

Kuwait

Views on Kuwait expressed in Soviet publications, whether before or after the crisis of June-July 1961, have lent no support to the Iraqi claim to sovereignty over Kuwait. The first Soviet reports on Qasim's claim referred to it as a "surprise" (PRAVDA 29.6.61) and as introducing "unexpected changes in the situation" (IZVESTIYA 30.6.61). Subsequent reports on the situation made scarcely any reference to the Iraqi claim, and concentrated on the dispatch of British forces to Kuwait, which was described (PRAVDA 2.7.61) as "absolutely unjustified". The matter was presented as follows in NEW TIMES (No.29 of 1961):

> "No sooner had the 1899 treaty been annulled than British troops were moved into Kuwait to 'protect its independence' against a pretended threat by Iraq. Talk of Iraq concentrating troops on the Kuwait border was started as an excuse for undertaking this occupation. The Iraqi Government has indeed made a claim to Kuwait, but it has explicitly stated that it means to settle the question by peaceful means only."

According to other Soviet accounts, the granting of independence to Kuwait was "a mere sham" (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.9 of 1961), and Britain's purpose in sending troops was to keep the oil profits in British and US hands (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.8 of 1961). The Shaykh of Kuwait was "devoted to the British colonial administration", and "betrayed his people by opening the doors to foreign invaders"; "the tragedy of Kuwait is aggravated by the fact that Britain intends to turn the occupation of Kuwait into a permanent one." The replacement of British by Arab League forces has not been reported in the Soviet press.

Saudi Arabia

TRUD (28.12.60) briefly reported King Sa'ud's decree proclaiming Saudi Arabia a constitutional monarchy, in which the government would be responsible to a national assembly. The 1961 Annual of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, which still refers to Saudi Arabia as an "absolute monarchy", states:

> "According to the Arab press, the programme of the new government states that the government will direct its internal policy towards raising the living standard of the people and liquidating ignorance and disease, and also widening the authority of the local administration."

PRAVDA VOSTOKA (30.3.61) published an article commenting on the Saudi decision not to renew the lease of the US air base at Dahran. The newspaper said that in 1957 the USA had "obliged" the Saudi Government to extend the lease. The base was one of the biggest maintained by the USA in a foreign country. According to the Lebanese newspaper AN-NIDA, the Dahran base had no other aim than "preparation for aggressive war against the socialist camp, and the suppression of the national liberation movement of the Middle East peoples".

In an article on social forces and the rise of national consciousness in Saudi Arabia (SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.5 of 1961) A.N. Pershits maintained that "oppression by American imperialism" had accelerated the national consolidation of the country; "the principal moving force of the growing national liberation movement in Saudi Arabia is not the bourgeoisie but the young working class, and first of all the army of oil-workers of Al-Hasa, cruelly exploited by Aramco." Pershits referred again to the strikes of 1956, "launched under the slogans of liquidating the US oil concession and US bases in Saudi Arabian territory", which he said were put down by "brutal" police action (see MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.3 of 1959, p.3). "Today the principal thing is the further activization of the anti-imperialist movement, resolved to remove the barriers placed by American colonialism in the way of the national development of this, the biggest Arab country in Asia."

Lebanon

The only Lebanese political issue to receive any prominence in the Soviet press was (as in previous years) the question of visits by units of the US Sixth Fleet to the port of Beirut. Soviet newspapers reported the Lebanese Government's withdrawal of permission for such a visit on 20th March, and its subsequent decision to allow the visit. PRAVDA's Baghdad correspondent Demchenko was in Beirut on a visit when the US vessels were in the harbour, and in an account of his impressions of the Lebanon

(AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA Nos.5 and 6 of 1961) he represented Lebanese public opinion as implacably hostile to the US visits:

> "A number of newspapers drew attention to the fact that the visit coincided with the beginning of the election campaign. The Americans would like to support their friends in the Lebanon, and to exert pressure on parties and groups which are anti-imperialist in orientation."

Demchenko expressed no direct criticism of Lebanese Government policy, but had a good deal to say on the subject of confessionalism, whose influence in Lebanese politics he deplored. "Lebanese citizens", he observed, "are equal before the law"; but, he implied, the Muslims did not get a fair deal - the Muslim districts were the poorest and least well provided with roads and schools, and in business "the Christian bourgeoisie takes the lead". The churches possessed a considerable propaganda apparatus.

> "'And what of the political parties', you may ask. Division and discrimination according to religion - that which, in a word, is called confessionalism - is far from being an all-powerful force in present-day Lebanon. These things are clutched at only by those who want to break up the ranks of the people's masses and to weaken their revolutionary liberation struggle. Where religion is, there is hypocrisy. Here it also serves above all as a facade behind which a stubborn political struggle is in progress ...
>
> "In the Lebanon there are many parties, as there are many religions. There are Christian parties, and there are Muslim parties. The first are inclined to collaboration with the Western countries, the second put the strengthening of inter-Arab relations above all else ... But not all parties choose their members according to religion. This applies above all to the Lebanese Communist Party. Officially the Communist Party was long ago suppressed, but it is active, and publishes newspapers, which the people read and love."

Jordan

The Communist Party of Jordan is one for which - unlike those of Iraq and Syria - the Soviet Union has been able to express full support without compromising Soviet relations with a friendly government. The statement made at the CPSU Congress by its Secretary-General Fuad Nassar, that in Jordan "terror and oppression reign, directed against all our people and especially against our Communist Party", sums up also the Soviet view of Jordan at the present time. The Soviet press has given little attention to Jordan during the past year. An article on the situation and policies

of the Communist Parties of Asian and African countries (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No.5 of 1961) gave the following account of the position in Jordan:

> "Supported by American imperialism, reactionary Jordanian circles, headed by King Husayn, carried out a coup d'etat in 1957 which deprived the people of its democratic freedoms. Police terror is rampant in the land. All parties, including the Communist Party, trade unions, and mass organizations of peasants, students, women and civil servants are prohibited. The reactionaries deal particularly severely with members of the Communist Party. Hundreds of Communists and patriots have been thrown into prison, where they are tortured. The government recently passed a law on the 'suppression of Communism'. By this law any person suspected of being a member of the Communist Party or of having connections with the Communists can be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
>
> "In spite of persecution the party continued as before to urge the masses to struggle against reaction and unmask the aggressive plans of the US imperialists and their internal agents in the country. The Communists demand the liquidation of the anti-national, pro-imperialist regime of King Husayn and urge the establishment of a government which would reflect the interests of the popular masses. The call of the Communist Party, 'National unity against the powers of reaction and obscurantism', finds ever wider support among the broad layers of the workers and the national bourgeoisie, who are dissatisfied with the pro-American policy of King Husayn."

Israel

Soviet attacks on the domestic and foreign policies of the Israeli Government have not abated during 1961, although, as in previous years, these are mainly confined to the periodical press and only appear infrequently in Soviet daily newspapers.

From time to time the fundamental Soviet view of Zionism is restated, as in an article in NEW TIMES (No.4 of 1961) by Z. Sheynis, a leading Soviet writer on Israeli affairs. The Israeli leaders, said Sheynis, tried to delude the masses by talking about "the national unity of world Jewry" in order to obscure the class differentiation among the Jews. The notion of a single world-wide Jewish nation was "simply absurd", whereas in Israel "class differentiation is evident at every turn". It was not by assembling in a "national home" that the Jewish people could free themselves from capitalist exploitation, but by "fighting in labour's common ranks against the exploiters, for the final defeat of imperialism". In this fight Israel's Communist Party took the lead; "tirelessly combating

Zionism and exposing its pernicious essence, it summons the people to battle for their class interests, for peace and international security, against the machinations of US imperialism, which the international Zionist leaders abet". In Israel the class struggle was developing, "with strikes and demonstrations of protest against exploitation, against rising prices, against economic militarization".

> "The Israeli government leaders, who have the shamelessness to call themselves socialists, say that in Israel there is no room for class struggle, for there is 'national unity' - unity of exploiters and exploited, are we to understand? But no sooner do the workers demand better conditions and back up their demands with strike action than these Zionist rulers call out the police to beat them up and throw them behind the bars. In this respect too Israel is in no way different from other capitalist states."

Soviet comment on the Israeli election campaign alleged that Ben Gurion and the Mapai leaders had "set off a wave of war hysteria" in order to generate support for their party. NEW TIMES (No.33 of 1961) said that this had "produced 20 incidents on the Israeli-Arab frontier in April-July, 17 of which led to bloodshed".

> "There have been more frequent border incidents since Ben Gurion's visit to the NATO countries, and more talk in Tel Aviv about producing atomic weapons. Secret work in that direction is being conducted in the Negev desert at NATO expense and with the help of NATO experts ... Of course, the imperialists are pursuing their own aims in encouraging Ben Gurion to intensify his adventurist policy. A short while ago Israel was visited by representatives of the US naval command. They inspected the construction of the new port at Ashod Yam, near the UAR frontier, a joint Israeli-American project. The port will be used as a base for the US Sixth Fleet."

The alleged worsening condition of the workers is a regular theme in Soviet writing on Israel; it is claimed (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.5 of 1961) that both unemployment and the number of strikes have been steadily growing in recent years; "the strike movement in Israel is embracing wider and wider sections of the population, and the consciousness and political maturity of Israeli workers is growing."

According to the Soviet view, as has been noted (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.9 of 1959, p.6), the future for Israel lies in accommodation with her Arab neighbours and the pursuit of an independent foreign policy that will ensure peace and benefit the Israeli working masses; the role of the masses in bringing about a "democratic" solution of Israel's problems is increasingly emphasized. On Israeli-Arab relations, the Israeli

delegate at the CPSU Congress, Samuel Mikunis, said that the Israeli Communist Party was struggling for peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict "on the basis of mutual recognition of the lawful rights of both peoples, the Arab people of Palestine and the Israeli people". There is no indication that Soviet thinking on the subject is in any way different from this, nor do the more extreme Arab claims and assertions receive any acknowledgment, let alone support, in Soviet writing.

An aspect of Israel's policy that has recently attracted Soviet attention is its growing economic activity in Africa. The Soviet view is that in Africa Israel is acting as "the servant of US neo-colonialism" (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.1 of 1961):

> "This country, which has been in the orbit of US imperialism for a long time, is now used as its instrument of influence in Africa. This plan is based, in the first place, on the fact that Israel is a small country without formal connections with colonialism; secondly, that the 'socialist' trappings of the ruling Mapai Party can be exploited to deceive the African people."

Israeli enterprise in Africa, according to this article, is largely financed with US funds.

The only Israel topic that has been prominently featured in the Soviet press during the past year is the Eichmann trial; the main burden of all Soviet comment on this has been that the accomplices of Eichmann are still at large in Western Germany, occupying leading positions, and that the Israeli authorities have deliberately done everything to suppress evidence about their activities, in response to pressure from Bonn.

Turkey

The restraint shown by the Soviet press in commenting on Turkish affairs, during the first six months after Gen. Gursel's government came to power, has not been maintained during 1961. Complaints about Turkey's participation in NATO and CENTO activities have again come to the fore, as well as sharp retorts to alleged anti-Soviet articles published in the Turkish press. As regards internal affairs, Soviet writers assert that the condition of Turkish workers has in no way improved under the new regime. Of the Turkish parties which took part in the recent elections, nearly all are condemned as reactionary.

Soviet hopes of better relations with the new Turkish regime were expressed as follows by Gromyko in his report on the international situation to the Supreme Soviet (PRAVDA 24.12.60):

> "The new leaders of Turkey have expressed their intention of improving relations with the Soviet Union and reviving the Soviet-Turkish friendship which, you will remember, was characteristic of relations between both countries in the time of Lenin and Ataturk. It goes without saying that these intentions meet with full sympathy and support on the part of the Soviet Government. Let us hope that clear and warm weather, such as we all usually enjoy on coming to the Black Sea area, will be established with our neighbour on the Black Sea."

A Soviet note delivered to Turkey on 3rd February complained about reports of the construction of rocket bases in Turkey; "using the bases granted them in Turkish territory, foreign military circles threaten the security of the USSR and other countries bordering on Turkey, as well as Turkey itself". The CENTO meeting in Ankara in April was the occasion for renewed Soviet attacks on the character of the alliance, as "an instrument of US and British aggressive policy". Reviewing the first year of the new regime, IZVESTIYA (28.5.61) called for "practical actions" and "concrete measures" in support of Turkish affirmations of good will towards the Soviet Union. On 23rd September a Soviet note was delivered to Turkey protesting about the NATO "Checkmate" exercise as constituting a "hostile demonstration" against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries; NATO operations in the Straits and the Black Sea were "incompatible with international agreements on the regime of the Straits and the Black Sea and with the lawful interests of the Black Sea states".

The signing of a Turkish-Soviet agreement on trade exchanges during 1961, and the conclusion of an agreement on a direct railway link between the two countries, were applauded in the Soviet press, which pointed out that "the possibilities of further development of economic relations are far from exhausted" (IZVESTIYA 28.5.61).

Numerous instances of anti-Soviet articles in the Turkish press have been alleged. Y. Plotnikov (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.4 of 1961) said that Gen.Faruk Guventurk had accused Menderes of having "intended to sell out Turkey to Russia", and MILLIYET, "which has a penchant for such dubious sensations", had taken up this "canard". Plotnikov also accused TERCUMAN of publishing articles about "the forcible Russification of millions of Soviet Muslims" in Central Asia, and Prof. Ahmet Sukru Esmer of alleging that the Soviet Union would resort to atomic war "if capitalism continues to bar the inevitable victory of world Communism". IZVESTIYA (15.7.61) and PRAVDA (27.6.61) spoke of "anti-Communist hysteria" in Turkey and a "wave of arrests" of alleged Communists; according to IZVESTIYA, the Turkish press and radio were conducting a "rabid anti-Communist and anti-Soviet witch-hunt", which showed that "Turkey's policy has recently begun to slip down again into the old Menderes rut".

The situation of the workers in Turkey was the subject of an article in AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.8 of 1961, entitled "No Change". This said that, faced by widespread and increasing unemployment, low pay and unhealthy conditions in factories, Turkish trade unions had recently been holding meetings to voice their demands. The new Turkish Constitution contained a clause which gave workers the right to strike, but this was nullified by other clauses. "The workers are becoming more and more convinced that during the time the National Unity Committee has been in power apart from promises nothing has been done to improve the material situation of Turkish workers, to grant them elementary rights, and to liquidate unemployment."

The election campaign in Turkey was largely ignored by the Soviet daily press; the only comment (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 4.10.61) sought to present the new electoral system as "undemocratic", and alleged that anti-Soviet propaganda, with US backing, was playing a large part in the campaign. The following descriptions of the Turkish political parties were given in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No.9 of 1961): "The Republican People's Party is the party of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, senior officials and part of the landed aristocracy ... The Republican Peasants and Nation Party is a party of big and medium landowners, middle and petty bourgeoisie and reactionary rural clergy. Reflecting the views of the landowners and the kulaks, the party opposes everything progressive in the country's social life ... The New Turkey Party is a party of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and big landowners, mainly from the Aegean Sea area. The party has sympathy and support from the USA ... The Justice Party is a haven for petty bourgeois nationalist pro-fascist elements of the banned party of Menderes and Bayar, extreme Right-wing officers (mostly discharged from the army) and officials opposing the existing regime and clamouring for an even greater turn to the Right."

Persia

During the first four months of 1961 little adverse comment on Persian policy was published in the Soviet press. This restrained tone was exemplified in an IZVESTIYA article (27.3.61) on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet-Persian treaty of 26th February 1921. This maintained that friendly relations with the USSR had always benefited the Persian people; Afghanistan and Finland were cited as examples of neighbours of the Soviet Union which would never allow any outside forces to influence their good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union for its part was striving for such relations with Persia, and hoped that the same goodwill would be shown by the Persian side, not only in words but in deeds. PRAVDA (28.2.61) reported that the visit of the Persian Premier Sharif Emami to Moscow had had to be postponed in view of the Majles elections; a date would be fixed later.

Soon after the installation of Dr. Ali Amini as Premier the Soviet press began to give close attention to political developments in Persia. The main emphasis was on alleged general popular dissatisfaction with the regime, the spread of the strike movement, and the growth of the movement for a neutral foreign policy. The resurgence of the National Front, and of sentiment in favour of Dr. Mosaddeq, was emphasized. A long article in IZVESTIYA of 27.7.61 condemned the "brutal" suppression of the National Front demonstrations of 21st July in Tehran. Persian press and radio allegations that Moscow had inspired the disturbances were indignantly denounced as a "gross anti-Soviet provocation" which had US backing; "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to such provocations launched to the detriment of peace and security in the Middle East."

The Soviet attitude towards the National Front is not one of wholehearted support. Ya. Malykin (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.8 of 1961) says: "This organization, whose ideological leader is Mohammad Mosaddeq, is an alliance of opposition elements which is extremely heterogeneous in composition. Reformist-inclined representatives of the intelligentsia and middle bourgeoisie predominate in its leadership." However, the writer seems to approve of the programme of the National Front in so far as it calls for revision of the Consortium agreement of 1954, withdrawal from CENTO, immediate elections and drastic measures to improve the economic situation. G. Mirskiy (KOMMUNIST No.11 of 1961) says that the National Front has a Right wing, "inclined towards compromise with the government", and a Left wing which calls for the appointment of Mosaddeq as Premier "in order to create the conditions for holding democratic elections". The opposition forces are divided on many issues, "but all are unanimous on one issue: it is essential to change the government's foreign policy".

On 18th August Tass made public some alleged secret documents of the former Baghdad Pact Organization which purported to reveal plans for atomic bombing of frontier areas of Persia (among other countries) in order to deny access to these areas to an enemy. These alleged documents, subsequently referred to by the Soviet press as "the CENTO secret documents", provided the material for a propaganda campaign against CENTO, which was represented as an imminent threat to the peoples of its member countries. On 15th September PRAVDA published a statement by Jalal Mortazavi, a major in the Persian Army, who had asked for political asylum in the Soviet Union; he said he was convinced that Persia's alliance with the USA was bringing the country to ruin, denounced the "CENTO documents", and called on his compatriots to set up a genuinely popular government which would take a "new road" in foreign policy.

The "exploitation" of the Persian masses continues to be a theme of Soviet writing on Persia, but it is presented as part of the larger picture of US "military and economic domination" of the country; the alleged growth of Persian sentiment in favour of neutrality and abandonment of Persia's Western alliances is now the leading theme of Soviet commentators.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on Middle East affairs appearing in Soviet newspapers during the period 18th October - 28th November.

Syria

The Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Soviet Union, Munir Musa Pasha, arrived in Moscow on 16th November (PRAVDA 18.11.61).

PRAVDA (23.11.61) noted that the new Syrian Premier, Dr. Izzat an-Nuss, had declared in a broadcast that his provisional government would pursue a policy of positive neutrality and non-adherence to blocs.

PRAVDA (22.11.61) reported that Khalid Bakdash, Secretary-General of the Syrian Communist Party, who arrived in Damascus on 19th November in a Czechoslovak aircraft, was not allowed to leave the aircraft and had been obliged to return to Prague.

On his return to Prague Khalid Bakdash gave an interview to a correspondent of the Italian Communist newspaper UNITA, which was reported as follows by PRAVDA (24.11.61):

> "The resignation of the head of the government demonstrates the deep rift in the Syrian bourgeoisie. The policy which the Right wing is trying to impose is meeting with opposition not only from the popular masses but even from certain circles of the democratic bourgeoisie. I may say that I know all those who took part in the rising against the dictatorial regime of Nasir, and I know too that among them there are sincere democrats. Quite obviously they cannot approve of the position of the most reactionary bourgeois groups.
>
> "It may be hoped that circumstances in Syria will develop in a democratic spirit, even if this development takes place as a

result of a savage struggle. Democracy has struck deep roots in Syria, and not only among the working class. I know that during those days many students who demanded the restoration of democratic freedoms and free elections were thrown into prison."

Asked whether the elections would allow a return to a normal situation, Bakdash said: "If by a normal situation one understands a situation chracterized by complete freedom for all political forces on the basis of what existed before Nasir's dictatorship, then I think not. The way in which these elections are being prepared clearly shows that the representatives of the Right-wing camp are doing all they can to prevent the people from expressing their will freely. In the electoral system in force before the union with Egypt amendments were brought in with the express purposes of preventing the nomination of certain candidates.

"The condition of a return to democracy in Syria is the unity of the forces which fight against all forms of colonialism. The Right wing is trying to impose a policy which internally throws doubt on the economic achievement of the workers and in external relations can place the country in a position subordinate to the great colonial powers. But the Syrian people does not want this."

PRAVDA (28.11.61) published the following dispatch from its special correspondent in Beirut, P. Demchenko, under the heading "Syria on the Eve of the Elections":

"A general election is due to be held in the Syrian Arab Republic on the 1st December. In fact it is a referendum, in the course of which the Syrians have to decide two points: firstly, whether to approve or repudiate the temporary constitution, the draft text of which was recently published, and secondly, to elect the deputies of the Constituent Assembly. The leaders of the Syrian Government and army say that the convocation of the Constituent Assembly will bring to an end the present transitional period and reinstate the parliamentary machine in the country.

"The two months which have passed since restoration of independence in Syria have in fact been occupied with preparations for the election. Naturally, one of the first questions to arise in the course of these preparations has been that of the democratic freedoms enjoyed by the Syrian people up to the spring of 1958. Then, as is well known, there were political parties, and newspapers and journals of various leanings were published. At present the provisional government has decided to retain the law on the prohibition of parties. The newspapers say that later the question of the fate of the parties will be put before parliament for consideration.

"Nevertheless the one-time leaders of the parties have not remained aside from working out the political course of the country and from preparation for the election. At the beginning of November there assembled in Damascus for consultation politicians who had held leading positions in previous Syrian governments, and who presume to play a similar role in the next. Up to 1958 there was a front of parliamentary solidarity in Syria. It united both the bourgeois deputies and the representatives of the Left-wing forces, and played a positive part in the strengthening of national unity. But the representatives of the Left-wing forces were not invited to the November consultations. Those taking part in the consultations published a signed document which basically reflects the demands of the national bourgeoisie, although the needs of the workers are also mentioned in it. It says that the political regime in Syria will be built on the principle of parliamentary democracy, and that the constitution will guarantee the citizens social freedoms. It declares the necessity for the implementation of agrarian reforms, the liquidation of unemployment, and the concession of trade union freedoms to the working class.

"A few days after this conference the government approved the text of the temporary constitution and assigned a date for the election. There will be 165 deputies in the Constitutional Assembly. Over one and a half million people are entered in the electoral lists, or approximately a third of the population of the country.

"In addition some Syrians are deprived of the right to vote or to enter their names in the lists of candidates. Among them is a large group of political prisoners, including not a few Communists, who made a great contribution to the struggle for the liberation of the Syrian people from imperialist oppression. After the events of September in Syria some of those arrested were released. At the same time a commission was set up to determine the fate of those still in confinement. Syrian public opinion thinks that the work of this commission is taking longer than is permissible, and dozens of patriots are still in prison.

"Syrians who emigrated from the country to save themselves from persecution are still waiting for permission to return. On the 19th November Khalid Bakdash, the Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, arrived in Damascus by air. He was a deputy in the last Syrian parliament and hoped to put himself forward as a candidate in the coming election. But the authorities forbade him to leave the aeroplane and ordered him to leave Syrian territory.

"The election is an important event in the life of Syria. The Constituent Assembly, as foreseen by the temporary constitution, will perform the legislative function in the country. At one of its first sittings it will elect a President of the Republic, and within six months it will work out the text of a permanent constitution. After this the assembly will become a parliament, to hold power for four years.

"Imperialist circles in the West are at present trying to put pressure on Syria and take advantage of its economic difficulties in order to tie the country with one-sided agreements and force it to set up an anti-democratic order. That is why the Syrians greeted with great satisfaction the announcement by the temporary government that Syria will follow a policy of neutrality and non-participation in military blocs. The Syrian people has famous traditions of liberation and democracy. Friends of Syria hope that the Syrian Arab Republic will even in future remain faithful to these traditions, which originated in the years of dauntless struggle against the imperialists and colonizers."

UAR In a message to Khrushchev on the October Revolution anniversary (PRAVDA 10.11.61) President Nasir said that the people of the UAR realized that the October Revolution was not only a historic turning-point for the Soviet people but also had far-reaching results for the liberation movement in countries which had long suffered under imperialist oppression. The people of the UAR were at the same time celebrating their own victory over the "triple aggression" of 1956, and they remembered the support given to them at that time by "the free peoples of the world led by the great Soviet people". The firm friendship between the peoples of the UAR and the Soviet Union, "despite the ideological differences which exist", was fundamental to the foreign policy of the UAR, which was based on positive neutrality and struggle against imperialism and the backwardness caused by imperialist exploitation.

PRAVDA (21.10.61) noted the favourable comments of the Cairo press on Khrushchev's report to the CPSU Congress. Tass (PRAVDA 12.11.61) reported that At-Tahrir publishing house in Cairo had issued an Arabic translation of the full text of Khrushchev's report.

Iraq In a message to Khrushchev on the October Revolution anniversary (PRAVDA 10.11.61) Gen. Qasim praised the influence of the October Revolution on "the spiritual and material life of many peoples of the world" and also the Soviet Union's "realistic policy in the spheres of strengthening peace, disarmament and the struggle against imperialism".

PRAVDA VOSTOKA (13.10.61) stated that when Tashkent State University opened a course for foreign students on 11th October "the first students were 50 young men from Iraq".

Saudi Arabia Brezhnev sent a message of greeting to King Sa'ud on the anniversary of his accession, expressing his hopes for the further development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia (IZVESTIYA 14.11.61).

Yemen Khrushchev and Brezhnev sent a message of greetings to King Ahmad on the anniversary of his accession (PRAVDA 19.10.61).

Lebanon Soviet newspapers published extracts of favourable Lebanese comment on the CPSU Congress. IZVESTIYA (1.11.61) quoted AD-DUNYA AL-JADIDAH as saying that the "happy and progressive social structure" of the USSR was "such as humanity has never before known". PRAVDA's correspondent in Beirut, P. Demchenko, in an article on Lebanese Independence Day, said that Lebanese realized that the Soviet Union was "the reliable friend of the Arabs", and this accounted for their interest in the CPSU Congress.

Israel IZVESTIYA (15.11.61) quoted KOL HAAM for a report of demonstrations by unemployed immigrants in Kiryat Gad, demanding work and bread, and a demonstration by old people in Haifa demanding the restoration of pensions of which they had been deprived by a recent law.

Turkey Brezhnev sent a message of greetings to Gen. Gursel on the 38th anniversary of the Turkish Republic (PRAVDA 31.10.61). In an article on the anniversary IZVESTIYA (29.10.61) noted that there had been some favourable developments in Soviet-Turkish relations during the past year, and expressed the hope that the new Turkish Government which emerged from the elections would follow the traditions of Ataturk, in the interests of the Turkish people itself and of Soviet-Turkish friendship.

Brezhnev sent a message of greetings to Gen. Gursel on his election as President of the Turkish Republic (PRAVDA 6.11.61). Gen. Gursel sent a message of greetings to Brezhnev on the anniversary of the October Revolution (PRAVDA 10.11.61). The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union and Council of Nationalities sent a message of good wishes to the President of the Turkish Senate and the National Assembly (PRAVDA 22.11.61). Khrushchev sent a message of good wishes to Ismet Inonu on his appointment as Premier (PRAVDA 26.11.61).

A Tass dispatch from Istanbul (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 15.10.61) claimed that there were four million unemployed in Turkey and that the cost of living was the second highest in the world; this was the result of military expenditure caused by Turkey's participation in military blocs. An article in MILLIYET, said Tass, had complained that the huge number of soldiers under arms reduced Turkey's productive power, and the vast defence expenditure prevented essential capital investment.

A Tass dispatch from Istanbul (TRUD 23.11.61) said that the American Col. Ripple had declared at the NATO HQ in Izmir that Turkey and Greece

possessed atomic weapons, and that NATO personnel were undergoing training at an atomic military school in Western Germany.

Persia The Shah sent a message of greetings to Brezhnev on the anniversary of the October Revolution (PRAVDA 10.11.61).

A Tass dispatch from Istanbul (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 31.10.61) quoted statements by Sardar Fakher Hekmat, former President of the Majles, who declared that the Persian Government was violating the Constitution; elections should have been held within four months after the dissolution of parliament, but six months had already elapsed; the Persian Premier should remember how Menderes was punished for violating the Turkish Constitution.

Cyprus Archbishop Makarios sent a message of greetings to Brezhnev on the anniversary of the October Revolution (PRAVDA 11.11.61). KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (3.11.61) quoted articles in the Soviet press applauding the decisions of the CPSU Congress. PRAVDA (8.11.61) reported the October Revolution anniversary meeting held in Nicosia, organized by AKEL.

SOVIET VIEWS ON NIGERIA

The political picture of Nigeria which emerges from Soviet accounts is a pattern of conflicting "reactionary" and "progressive" forces. Soviet writers express only guarded confidence that the "progressive" forces will prevail in the long run.

The present analysis of Soviet views is based on the following articles, which will subsequently be referred to by the author's name only (writers who have visited Nigeria - including O. Orestov, who was PRAVDA's West African correspondent - are marked with an asterisk):

*O. Orestov, "General Elections in Nigeria", SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK No. 4 of 1960.

V. Rybakov, "Nigeria on the Threshhold of Independence", MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No. 2 of 1960.

*V. Pulavskiy, "Nigeria", NEW TIMES No.40 of 1960.

M. Gostev, "Nigeria - The Problems of Independence", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.11 of 1960.

*D. Turchaninov, "The Second Birth of the Country of Palms", AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No. 4 of 1961.

L. Kim, "Nigeria's First Year of Independence", MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No. 8 of 1961.

First Soviet impressions of the political parties Soviet writers allege that Britain fostered dissension between the various peoples of Nigeria in order to retard Nigerian national unity and delay the granting of independence. They disapprove of Nigeria's federal structure and of its present Constitution. Pulavskiy states: "In 1947 the British, seeking to perpetuate tribal disunity, divided Nigeria into three regions - West, East and North." Orestov says:

> "The British insisted that Nigeria should be proclaimed a Federation ... The Constitution which in 1958 London imposed on the Nigerians legalized the partition of the country and led to even greater rivalry between local political leaders."

The political and economic backwardness of the North is emphasized. Orestov says: "The North of the country has remained until our days the realm of Muslim feudalists, subjecting the local population to their

will ... Northern Nigeria is an extremely backward province. Here there are not even the rudiments of industry, although the region possesses valuable mineral raw materials ... To Nigeria's misfortune, the northern feudalists possess unlimited influence over the population." This state of affairs is blamed on the British system of indirect rule: "All these local rulers were only puppets in the hands of British imperialism. For 'services' rendered to it British imperialism gave the emirs the possibility of exploiting their 'subjects'."

At the time of the December 1959 elections, Soviet views on the Nigerian political parties were clear-cut and unambiguous. Rybakov said that the Northern People's Congress "expresses the interests of the Hausa feudalists". Orestov called its leader, the Sardauna of Sokoto, "the most influential and most reactionary figure on the present Nigerian political scene". The Nigerian Premier, Sir Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "enjoyed all possible support from the British administration". The foreign policy programme of the Northern People's Congress was "directed to strengthening the links between Nigeria and Britain and the other Western powers"; the party "rejects the policy of neutrality and considers that Nigeria's destiny must be linked with the West".

Rybakov said of the Action Group that it "represents the upper crust of the bourgeoisie of the Western Region and the Yoruba feudalists". Orestov said of the foreign policy aims of its leader Obafemi Awolowo:

> "Awolowo more than once openly declared that his party intended to bind Nigeria firmly to be bloc of the Western powers. He said that the policy of neutrality would be 'suicide for the country', since 'the forces of democracy throughout the world are threatened'. He insisted that Nigeria should not forget the 'good deeds' done to her by Britain'."

Orestov noted that the Northern People's Congress opposed the Action Group, but did not examine the reasons for this. In a PRAVDA dispatch on the 1959 elections he alleged that the British authorities sought to influence the outcome of the elections, and that the Americans also had a hand in this. Staying in his hotel in Lagos, he said, were some employees of a well-known US publicity firm who were organizing the Action Group's electoral propaganda. "The Americans flooded the country with posters for this party, sent up aircraft which wrote in the sky 'Vote for Awolowo', and, finally, sent off helicopters to drop leaflets."

Rybakov called the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons "the leading party of the national bourgeoisie". Its slogan of a united and independent Nigeria, he said, enjoyed the widest support among different sections of the population. Orestov said that its leader Nnamdi Azikiwe "has for many years headed the national liberation movement in Nigeria", and "is extremely popular in the country, especially among the youth and

the progressive intelligentsia". The NCNC was the only party which could claim to be called an all-national organization.

> "In its electoral programme the NCNC promised to pursue a policy of non-adherence to great power blocs, a policy of peace and friendship with all nations. In this respect its policy is close to that of the ruling Convention People's Party of Ghana. But, like Ghana, the NCNC prefers that Nigeria should remain in the British 'Commonwealth'. In its programme the NCNC has given much attention to the question of unity of the African peoples and the solidarity of Nigerians with the peoples of Africa who are fighting for independence."

Rybakov noted that Azikiwe "has declared, in particular, that after the proclamation of independence Nigeria will establish diplomatic relations with the USSR".

The Northern Elements Progressive Union, the NCNC's ally in the Northern Region, Orestov described as "one of the most progressive parties in the country", and "the only organization in Northern Nigeria which resolutely opposes the feudal regime and the authority of the sultans and emirs". The party had encountered serious difficulties; "the feudal chiefs tried to raise the population against it, and the local 'native' police, which exist parallel with the state police, threw supporters of the party into prison."

Orestov did not try to explain the reasons for the NPC-NCNC coalition, following the NPC's victory in the elections, but confined himself to the following observations:

> "It is still not known how and on what basis the two parties which have entered the government can reconcile their antagonistic views on foreign policy. But many express the hope that the NCNC's entry into the Cabinet will have a positive influence on the policy of the new government."

Shifts in alignment During 1960 Soviet writers abandoned their former labels for the Nigerian political parties, and began to detect "progressive" trends in parties formerly labelled as "reactionary". Thus Pulavskiy, in his article published in September 1960, said of the Northern People's Congress:

> "Its leaders on the whole stand for preserving the federal system, but of late are beginning to come out for limited autonomy /i.e. for each region/ and for extending the powers of the central government. In foreign policy the NPC tends towards neutrality, but the party is internally divided on this question.

Orestov, in a dispatch on the independence celebrations (PRAVDA 1.10.60), observed that NCNC participation in the government had in fact had "a positive influence" on the government's foreign policy:

> "On the eve of the proclamation of independence Balewa in an interview with journalists emphasized that the government does not wish to align the country with any bloc. He added that his government will accept aid from any country which is ready to provide it. These serious advances in the position of the leader of the government are the result of the insistent demands of the Nigerian public."

The NCNC, however, is now no longer referred to as "progressive" without qualification; its 'Left wing", rather than the party as a whole, is regarded by L. Kim as reflecting the interests of "the progressive section of the national bourgeoisie". Kim says that the NCNC leader Michael Okpara, Premier of the Eastern Region, opposed the views of this "progressive section" when he resisted demands for the nationalization of foreign undertakings, on the ground that this would frighten away foreign capital.

Meanwhile, "progressive" views are considered to have their exponents in the government itself. M. Gostev says:

> "In building up their economy, the Nigerians are planning to make use of the wide experience of the socialist countries. An illustration of this point was the speech made in Nigeria's Parliament by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Dipcharima, who declared that the Soviet Union as a result of 'hard work and progressive policies' had become a powerful country and that Nigeria should follow its example."

The Action Group, formerly considered as resolutely pro-Western before it became the main Opposition party in the Federal Government, is now praised for its condemnation of the defence agreement with Britain; L. Kim expresses approval of Awolowo's statements on the subject.

The British connection Soviet writers maintain that Nigeria's independence is impaired politically, by its British connections and in particular by the defence agreement with Britain, and economically, by the leading role of British firms in Nigerian trade, industry, etc. Gostev says:

> "One must not forget that the country's independence is limited by its status as a British Dominion. British 'advisers' dominate the government apparatus, and decisions on many

important state problems depend on them. The army and police force are in the hands of the British."

Other Soviet writers make less sweeping statements, and concentrate on particular issues. Orestov (PRAVDA 16.11.61) noted that in recent months "many important problems have arisen on which the opinions of the broad public and of the Nigerian Government differ sharply". These included Nigerianization, a cause which had been taken up by the Action Group. Awolowo had said that "the sky would not fall if all the British left Nigeria at once". There had been a widespread campaign for "the removal of the Englishman Stallard from the post of Secretary of the Federal Premier".

Particular condemnation is reserved for Nigeria's defence agreement with Britain. According to L. Kim, some Nigerian leaders agreed to this pact as a "tactical manoeuvre" in order to obtain independence the sooner, considering that subsequently circumstances would change "and that the agreement would in some way become inoperative". Kim gives the following account of the agreement:

> "The military agreement, in essence, infringes on the state sovereignty of Nigeria. The Federal Government is obliged to consult with Britain on all defence questions and to put its military airfields at Britain's disposal. The principle of 'mutual aid' automatically involves Nigeria in any war which the British imperialists may unleash ... The unrestricted stationing of British military aircraft on the country's territory prevents any control by the Nigerian Government over flights by foreign aircraft, even if these are directed against African countries."

Kim notes that the agreement was the target of a protest movement by students, and that on 21st December 1960 the government was obliged to ban public gatherings in Lagos for two weeks. Public opposition to the establishment of US Project Mercury bases in Nigeria is also noted.

The activities of "foreign monopolies" in Nigeria are a favourite Soviet theme. According to L. Kim, with the approach of independence the "colonialists" had changed their tactics in order to maintain their economic domination:

> "In the new conditions their old social support, the feudal and semi-feudal elements, proved inadequate. To maintain their rule in the country the British authorities sought to find new allies among the Nigerian bourgeoisie."

This, Kim goes on, they did by sharing with the bourgeoisie part of "the profits they received from the exploitation of the Nigerian people".

The composition of the marketing boards was altered so that "representatives of the local bourgeoisie also received the right to purchase goods destined for export". Cooperative organizations (Kim explains that these are purely "bourgeois" in character) and certain industrial undertakings were exempted from income tax. "On their side, the feudal and bourgeois leadership began to cooperate more closely with the colonial authorities. The British and other monopolies received assurances that after independence foreign undertakings in Nigeria would not be nationalized."

Independence, the writer affirms, "brought no radical changes in the economic condition of the workers". The working class "continues its struggle against exploitation by the foreign companies". In the tin mines the workers came out in defence of their rights, and on 10th December 1960 at Jos in Northern Nigeria 2,000 workers went on strike demanding higher pay. Within 10 days 47,000 workers were on strike. "The police dealt brutally with the strikers; four were killed, and many injured. The authorities allied themselves with the employers to put down the strike."

Kim describes as follows the economic demands of the Left wing of the NCNC, as representing the "progressive national bourgeoisie":

> "The representatives of this wing declare that so long as the key positions in the country's economy are in the hands of British capital it is impossible to solve the problem of liquidating economic backwardness. They propose to use the state's authority to nationalize banks, mining undertakings, power stations, transport, manufacturing industry, etc."

The trade unions. Of the two Nigerian trade union organizations, Soviet writers have no hesitation in supporting the Nigerian TUC and denouncing the TUC of Nigeria as a secessionist body endeavouring to split the working-class movement. Turchaninov, who visited the headquarters of the Nigerian TUC in Lagos and interviewed its General Secretary Gogo Chu Izeribe, gives the following account of the Nigerian trade union movement:

> "The first strike in the country was carried out by the Association of Railway Workers in 1920 under the leadership of M. Imodu (he is now chairman of the Nigerian TUC). The first workers' trade union was formed in 1932. In 1948 the Nigerian Trade Union Congress was formed, and in the following year it organized a general strike of Nigerian workers. The British dealt ruthlessly with the strikers.
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> "Ten years after the birth of the Nigerian TUC a group of its Right-wing leaders left the congress and formed its own union - the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria. Bora was elected

as its general secretary and Adebola as its chairman. But they are in fact generals without an army. Even according to their own obviously exaggerated figures, the TUC of Nigeria comprises less than 50,000 workers, while the Nigerian TUC counts some 300,000 members. However, the split dealt a considerable blow to the Nigerian workers' movement. This is shown, for example, by the following fact: on 11th December 1960 a strike of tin miners began in Bukuru, and 10,000 miners did not report for work, demanding improvements in working conditions, increased wages, and the institution of a minimum daily wage of three shillings and elevenpence instead of the existing beggarly sum of one shilling and eightpence a day. Two unions of the Nigerian TUC supported the strike: the Nigerian African Mineworkers' Union and the Union of African Mineworkers. The General Secretary of the latter, Doziye Igwenu, said in the name of the workers: 'We are tired of being treated like slaves. Down with the South African system in independent Nigeria.' The strike committee made a firm decision to struggle for the satisfaction of the workers' demands. But here the leaders of the Northern Mineworkers' Union, affiliated to the TUC of Nigeria, came to the aid of the employers. They advised their members not to take part in the strike and to report for work. The strikers posted pickets at the shafts and did not allow the blacklegs in. The police took advantage of the 'disorder' and opened fire on the unarmed crowd. In Bukuru the blood of Nigerian workers was shed, and there were several wounded and killed. Such were the results of the split in practice.

"However, the actions of Nigerian workers show that the working class of Nigeria is now no longer an amorphous mass, but an organized force, resolutely roused to struggle for its rights and for the improvement of its living and working conditions."

The 1961 Annual of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia states that the TUC of Nigeria belongs to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and that the Nigerian TUC "supports the World Federation of Trade Unions". It describes the aims of the Nigerian TUC as follows:

"Progressive trade union circles, headed by Imodu, have put forward a broad social and political programme: firm fulfilment of the policy of non-participation in blocs, nationalization of transport and communications, dismissal of all British personnel in key posts in the army, navy and police, nationalization of the mining industry, trade without discrimination with all countries of the world, an end to persecution of trade union leaders, the introduction of new labour laws, free and

compulsory secondary education and free medical care. Imodu and his supporters held a conference in Lagos in April 1960 which approved the programme and condemned the dissident actions of Bora's group. In the same month in Lagos a meeting took place between Imodu and leaders of the Ghana trade unions. A resolution on the formation of an all-African trade union federation was confirmed, and the creation of a fund for African liberation was suggested.

Foreign policy and relations with the Soviet Union As has been noted, Soviet commentators detected an improvement in the tone of Nigerian statements on foreign policy with the coming of independence. In his article on the December 1959 elections Orestov noted that, after his election victory, the Federal Premier in reply to a question on foreign policy "declared that independent Nigeria will strengthen its traditional links with Britain and extend its relations with the USA". In his dispatch on the independence celebrations Orestov reported the Premier as telling journalists that his government would not align the country with any bloc, and would accept aid from any country willing to give it.

The 1961 Annual of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia gives the following account of Nigerian foreign policy during 1960:

"In October Balewa declared that Nigeria opposes all blocs and does not intend to join any of them. However, in the matter of neutrality, independent foreign policy and military blocs Nigeria does not display any consistency, since it has concluded a defence agreement with Britain and given Britain the right to use Nigerian airfields and to provide Nigeria with arms and train officer personnel. Nigeria opposes the ending of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests, having officially stated its point of view at the 15th UN General Assembly session. In October Nigeria voted for the inclusion on the Assembly agenda of the question of admitting People's China to the UN. The Nigerian Government expressed a negative view of the Soviet proposal for reorganization of the UN executive, but in November came out in favour of increasing the number of permanent members of the Security Council and including representatives of African countries in it. Nigeria supported the Soviet proposal for UN discussion of the complete and final liquidation of colonialism, and was one of the authors of the declaration on colonialism. A Nigerian representative heads the UN conciliation commission in the Congo, and Nigeria continues to keep its contingent in the UN forces in the Congo."

The delay in the establishment of Soviet-Nigerian diplomatic relations was not directly criticized in the Soviet press, but Nigerian sentiment was represented as favouring the establishment of diplomatic relations. Orestov (PRAVDA 16.11.60) quoted the WEST AFRICAN PILOT as criticizing the Nigerian Premier's attitude on this and observing:

> "The Nigerian people has nothing against the people of the USSR. Some of us may not like Communism, but this does not mean we have nothing to learn from a country which has sent a rocket to the moon. We want Soviet diplomatic representation in Lagos."

L. Kim defined Nigerian sentiments on this issue as follows:

> "The progressive sections of the Nigerian public consider that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries will raise the international prestige of the young African state and promote the creation of favourable conditions for Nigeria's economic advance."

The development of Soviet-Nigerian economic, technical and cultural cooperation forecast after the Nigerian economic mission's visit to Moscow in June 1961 (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.7 of 1961, p.34) has to date received no further notice in the Soviet press. The appointment of a Soviet Ambassador to Nigeria was announced in PRAVDA on 26th October.

"Class contradictions" and tribal unrest The disturbances of August 1960 in the Tiv and Wukari divisions of Benue Province have received some notice in Soviet publications. L. Kim explains the disturbances as due to the opposition of the "Middle Belt" pagan tribes, who "live in extreme poverty", to their subjection to Muslim Hausa and Fulani chiefs appointed to rule them under the colonial regime; the result of this was that "class contradictions" became combined with "national contradictions". Kim gives the following account of the disturbances and the action taken by the authorities:

> "Angered by the arbitrary rule of the Northern Muslim chiefs, the tribes of the Middle Belt have for a long time been waging a struggle against them. At the end of August 1960 they rose in arms against the government of Northern Nigeria. The rising was led by the United Middle Belt Congress Party. Military operations extended over very large areas. The rebels' army, according to Agence France Presse, numbered 80,000 men. Against the rebels, who were armed with spears and poisoned arrows, the government forces had modern weapons including aircraft. In October 1960 the government was obliged to issue

an order on the dissolution of the 'native authorities' headed by the Middle Belt chiefs."

It is to be expected that Soviet commentators will continue to interpret developments in Nigeria in the context of pressure by the masses for the satisfaction of their demands by a government which, in Soviet eyes, has no broad popular basis.

AFRICA IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on African affairs appearing in the Soviet press during the period 16th October - 26th November.

Sudan

The visit of President Brezhnev to the Sudan, from 15th to 22nd November, was prominently reported in the Soviet press. For PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA the visit was covered by special correspondents, I. Belyayev and N. Drachinskiy. IZVESTIYA (14.11.61) published a long dispatch by N. Khokhlov, who was also in the Sudan, describing the Sudan's progress since independence and popular enthusiasm over the visit. Independence, he said, had not in itself "deprived the exploiter of the possibility of robbing the country and impeding its progress"; the Sudan's economy was "still under the control of foreign capital". However, the government was embarking on a seven-year plan of industrial and agricultural development, one of the chief projects of which was the construction of a big dam at Khashm al-Jirbah on the Atbara river. In foreign affairs the Sudan had adopted a policy of positive neutrality and non-adherence to military blocs. A propaganda campaign against the Sudan and its government had begun in the Western press, and Britain was showing particular zealousness in this matter. But the Sudan was not alone in its courageous fight against the enemies of its independence; "all the socialist countries profoundly understand and support the Sudanese people."

Much was made of the enthusiasm of the people over the visit; IZVESTIYA (24.11.61) said that there was not a single unfriendly face, except those of Western journalists who remembered the hostile reception given to Nixon when he visited the Sudan. Interest was aroused not only in the Sudan, however; the editor of the Nigerian DAILY TIMES came over in person to cover the visit. The tribes had been gathering for 10 days in El Obeid to catch a sight of Brezhnev, making a picturesque sea of tents and camels.

President Brezhnev's first engagement on 10th November was a visit to the memorial of the Unknown Soldier in Khartoum; later he visited Omdurman and Khartoum North; he rode around the decorated streets with President Abbud on the third anniversary of the revolution, a holiday; and he attended a football match. On 18th November he was taken by special train to Sennar, where he showed a keen interest in the Sennar dam, and in the afternoon he visited the agricultural centres of Barakat and Wad Medani. On the morning of 19th November he flew to El Obeid, the administrative centre of Kordofan province, and in the evening attended a reception. The next day was occupied by a visit to Port Sudan, with a visit to the hill resort of Erkovit in the afternoon.

President Brezhnev's speeches appear to have been relatively short, but appropriate to the time and place. Every opportunity was taken to glorify the Soviet Union's achievements in all fields of activity. Having been shown round Khartoum, he compared the task of the Sudanese in building it up to that of building up Moscow, and gave figures to show how much was under construction at the time, and what great feats had been achieved. In the cotton centre of Wad Medani he extolled Soviet production of cotton in Central Asia, and also emphasized its high production of meat, milk and wool. Cotton must have water, he said, and huge irrigation projects in the USSR were supplying the need. Praising El Obeid for its building up of industry, he compared it to the pioneer days of the Soviet state when the reconstruction of industry, agriculture, science and culture was a hard task; but the Soviet Union succeeded, and was now ready to help less fortunate countries to develop themselves.

A Soviet-Sudanese agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed in Khartoum on 21st November. Under this the Soviet Union will provide the Sudan with three grain elevators; factories for the processing of milk, fish and fruit and for the production of dried onions; an asbestos-processing plant; and scientific research laboratories - a veterinary laboratory, an agricultural laboratory and an experimental station for cotton selection (PRAVDA 23.11.61).

In a joint Soviet-Sudanese communique the two sides agreed on the necessity for immediate and complete disarmament, including nuclear, under strict control; the peaceful solution of the German problem; the liquidation of colonialism in all its forms; and the ending of the war in Algeria. They expressed satisfaction at the friendship between the USSR and the Sudan, based on peaceful coexistence and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Trade and economic relations between the two countries were developing well, as demonstrated by the signing this month of a trade agreement for 1962-64 and by the agreement reached in the communique of 26th July 1961 (PRAVDA 23.11.61).

Congo

After an interval of about a month during which no reports on the Congo were published in the Soviet press (part of which time was occupied by the CPSU Congress) IZVESTIYA and other newspapers on 14th November reported successes by the central Congolese Government forces in northern Katanga; Albertville had been occupied, and Baluba tribesmen had also driven Tshombe's administrators out of Manono and encircled Kongolo. The Tass correspondent in Leopoldville, however (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 21.11.61), said that "reactionary elements" were sabotaging this initiative by the central government forces; two weeks previously the government and the army command in the person of Gen. Mobutu had given orders to the forces in the Luluabourg area, which had begun to take action against Tshombe, to cease operations. The same had been done at Albertville.

The murder of the 13 Italian airmen at Kindu was briefly reported in a dispatch from Fedyashin, the Tass correspondent in Leopoldville, dated 16th November (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 18.11.61). This said that the murders had occurred "as a result of disorders provoked by irresponsible elements"; efforts by Gen. Lundula and the Minister of the Interior Gbeniya to restore order in Kindu had so far been unsuccessful. Subsequent reports sought to connect the Kindu murders with the Katanga situation. Fedyashin (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 21.11.61) said that the majority of Congolese "correctly assessed" the murders as "an infamous provocation by the enemies of the Congo". A report on the following day said that "the dispatch of UN reinforcements to Kindu is nothing else than an attempt to prevent the further advance of units of the national army into Katanga". In PRAVDA (24.11.61) T. Kolesnichenko said that Gizenga and Gen. Lundula had "liquidated the disorders" in Kindu, and yet the UN command continued to send forces there. It was quite clear who had "provoked" the murders:

> "Having provoked the tragic incident in Kindu, the colonialists are trying to use it to settle accounts with the patriotic leaders of the country, and above all with A.Gizenga. Spreading absurd rumours and downright slander, the reactionary Western press now demands a settlement of accounts with A. Gizenga, calling him an 'undesirable Lumumbist' in the Congo government. The colonialists are using every means to deprive A. Gizenga of parliamentary immunity."

In IZVESTIYA (24.11.61) N. Khokhlov said that "the incident in Kindu was provoked". The Italian airmen had been "torn to pieces by brutalized soldiers of the former Belgian Force Publique - that horrible offspring of the colonial regime". Responsibility for this fell on the UN command.

On the general political situation in the Congo, Khokhlov remarked that the composition of Cyrille Adoula's gouvernment was "very varied". In leading posts in the government there were "enemies of the republic and supporters of a deal with the colonialists". They did not yet dare to show themselves openly, but were none the less exerting their influence, and this accounted for the indecisiveness and sluggishness of the action of the central government's forces against the Katanga separatists. The central government had sufficient forces and mass support to reunite Katanga with the Congo, "if the colonialists do not resort to a new trick, and if this time they do not submerge the national task of the Congolese people in the struggles of political leaders and in tribal wars which they have themselves provoked". As regards the UN command, after Hammarskjoeld's death its leaders had "begun to make timid attempts to find a sensible solution to the Congolese problem". The UN forces included contingents from African and Asian countries "whose people know for themselves the character of the aggressive West", and this could not fail to influence the attitude of the UN command. But such promising initiatives had hardly begun when, guided by the Western representatives, the UN command concluded a bargain with Tshombe.

The economic situation in the Congo was the subject of a Tass dispatch from Fedyashin in Leopoldville (TRUKMENSKAYA ISKRA 12.11.61). He attributed the growth of unemployment, the shortage of foodstuffs and industrial products and the rise in prices to "attempts by imperialist forces to disorganize the economy and internal situation of the republic"; supplies were becoming exhausted, and attempts by the local authorities to stop the rise in prices were ineffective.

Commenting on the UN commission's report on the murder of Lumumba, Khokhlov (IZVESTIYA 17.11.61) deplored the fact that the commission had not been able to visit the scene of the crime; "the 20,000 strong UN army ... cowers before the Katanga puppet."

"Congo Day", 25th November, was marked by a meeting in the hall of the Polytechnical Museum in Moscow at which speeches were made by Prof. Potekhin and a representative of Congolese students, Massambat. The latter declared that the resolution of the 22nd CPSU Congress had "raised the militant spirit of the Congolese people".

Algeria

On 1st November, the eighth anniversary of the outbreak of the war in Algeria and the "National Day of Struggle for the Independence of Algeria", Soviet newspapers published articles reviewing the situation in Algeria and the prospects for peace. PRAVDA published an article by Larbi Buhali, Secretary of the Algerian Communist Party, who said that the FLN had "forced the French colonialists to retreat further and further" and to

give up a great part of their demands. "They have had to agree to the prospect of the inevitable independence of Algeria and the birth of a sovereign Algerian Republic. De Gaulle has also given way in the question of the Sahara, having agreed to the principle of future Algerian sovereignty over this part of our national territory." The prospect of Algerian independence had never been so close, but it would be a mistake to expect good will from the French side. "They threaten us with 'Congolization' and partition of the country if our people rejects their unacceptable neo-colonialist policy." The Algerian Communist Party had always been in the vanguard of the fight, but at the same time it considered it essential "to organize mass actions ... in order to lead to a wide mass movement of the whole people". The Party would always work for alliance of the Algerian people "with brotherly peoples, and above all with the peoples of the socialist camp". In the hands of every Algerian Communist the CPSU Programme would be "a powerful political and ideological weapon" which showed the road to national independence, peace and social progress.

On the occasion of the "National Day of Struggle for the Independence of Algeria" Khrushchev sent a message of greetings to Ben Kheddah. A meeting was held in the House of Friendship with Peoples of Foreign Countries, attended by the delegations of the Algerian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Moroccan, Syrian and Tunisian Communist Parties which attended the CPSU Congress. Speeches were made by Larbi Buhali, Secretary of the Algerian Communist Party, and the Moroccan Ambassador Bashir Ben Abbes (PRAVDA 1.11.61).

The hunger strike of Ben Bella and his colleagues in prison, and of thousands of other Algerians held in French prisons, was not reported in the Soviet press until 12th November. (The hunger strike, which had the object of securing the status of political prisoners for Algerians detained in France, began on 2nd November.) However, between then and 21st November, when the successful end of the hunger strike was reported, there was an extensive campaign of protests by Soviet organizations and expressions of solidarity with the imprisoned Algerians. Soviet organizations which made protests included the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent, the Soviet Council of Trade Unions, the Committee of Soviet Women and the Soviet Committee of War Veterans. Students from the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University and other foreign students in Moscow held a demonstration outside the French Embassy, and a students' protest meeting was held at the Moscow State University (PRAVDA 17.11.61). Soviet reports on the condition of Algerians imprisoned in France spoke of brutal and inhumane treatment. Reports on the ending of the hunger strike (PRAVDA, TRUD and KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 21.11.61) were published under the heading "The struggle is not ended"; the fight for the liberation of the Algerian prisoners, it was emphasized, still continued.

Other Countries

Morocco Foreign military delegations which visited Rabat for Morocco's Independence day celebrations on 18th November included a Soviet military delegation led by Marshal Sokolovskiy, which was received by King Hasan II on 22nd November (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19. and 23.11.61).

Guinea According to a Tass dispatch from Conakry (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 25.11.61) three US naval vessels which had arrived in Conakry for a three-day visit had been asked by the Guinean Government to leave on the second day, "since the conduct of the American sailors aroused the indignation of the inhabitants of Conakry". At a mass meeting in Conakry the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Ismail Toure, said that "the American sailors behaved in Guinea as if they were in a conquered country".

Mali A Tass correspondent in Bamako, R. Serebryannikov, reported an interview with Sori Wan, an official of the Defence Secretariat and of the youth section of the Union Soudanaise, on the subject of the 22nd CPSU Congress. The Tass correspondent also interviewed Tidiani Traore, the leader of the Mali delegation to the Congress. The latter said that the delegation had drawn some useful conclusions from the Congress which could be applied "in the conditions of the Mali Republic", and in particular "the final solution of the national problem in the USSR, a problem which we still have to solve". (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 25.11.61; BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 14.11.61)

Ethiopia On 25th November the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia presented to the Crown Prince of Ethiopia, as President of the Ethiopian Red Cross, 25 crates of medical supplies for flood victims. He said that the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent was also sending various medical equipment in addition. (IZVESTIYA 26.11.61)

I N D E X

VOLUME III 1961

Abbas, Ferhat, No.1, p.26; No.4, p.21; No.9, p.4

Abbud, Ibrahim, No.1, p.27; No.2, p.24; No.3, pp.26-7 and 34; No.6, p.28; No.8, pp.26-7; No.11, p.32

Accra Conference of African Peoples, No.5, p.13

Adil, Salam, No.10, pp.14-16; No.11, p.7

Adoula, Cyrille, No.8, p.23; No.9, pp.27-8; No.11, p.34

Africa (general), No.6, pp.15-23; No.7, pp.23-8; No.10, pp.1-20

African Peoples' Conference (Cairo, March 1961), No.5, pp.22-3

African studies, Soviet, No.2, pp.9-14; No.4, pp.11-16 and Supp., pp.1-19

Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, No.2, p.18; No.3, pp.5-6; No.5, pp.23-4

Afro-Asian Women's Conference (Cairo, January 1961), No.2, p.18

Agrarian reform, No.1, p.10; No.2, pp.5-6; No.3, pp.6-10; No.7, pp.10-11; No.11, p.6

Aid, Soviet economic, No.10, p.11

- Cyprus, No.8, p.14
- Ethiopia, No.5, p.18
- Ghana, No.4, p.23; No.7, pp.33-4; No.8, p.26
- Guinea, No.2, p.25; No.3, p.29; No.5, p.29; No.9, p.11
- Iraq, No.3, p.9; No.4, pp.8-9; No.5, pp.4-5 and 9; No.7, p.9
- Lebanon, No.2, p.16
- Mali, No.4, p.22; No.9, pp.13-14 and 30
- Morocco, No.5, p.28
- Nigeria, No.7, p.34
- Somalia, No.5, p.31; No.6, p.28; No.7, p.35; No.8, p.32
- Sudan, No.1, p.27; No.2, p.24; No.3, p.27; No.8, p.27; No.11, p.32
- Syria, No.10, pp.13-14; No.11, p.5
- Togo, No.7, p.34
- Tunisia, No.2, p.24; No.9, p.29
- Turkey, No.2, p.16; No.3, p.17; No.11, p.13

(Aid, Soviet economic, - continued)

UAR, No.2, p.14; No.3, pp. 7 and 16; No.6, pp.5-8; No.7, p.9; No.8, p.12; No.9, p.22

Yemen, No.4, p.9; No.5, p.9

Aleksandrov, I., No.5, p.10; No.6, pp.7-8

Alekseyev, L., No.4, p.10

Alekseyev, P., No.7, p.14

Algeria, No.1, pp.26-7; No.2, pp.23-4; No.3, pp.34-5; No.4, pp.21-2; No.5, pp.25-6; No.6, pp.27-8; No.7, pp.31-2; No.8, pp.28-9; No.9, pp.1-7 and 28-9; No.10, pp.11 and 17; No.11, pp.34-5

All-African Trade Union Federation, No.1, p.20; No.3, p.36; No.6, pp.23-4

Amini, Ali, No.6, p.12; No.11, p.15

Andreyev, Yu.N., No.5, pp.1-7; No.11, p.6

Andrianov, B.V., No.2, p.14

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, No.8, p.8

Angola, No.3, p.36; No.4, pp.19-20; No.5, p.28; No.6, pp.25-6; No.7, pp.29-30

Arab League, No.3, p.16; No.9, p.21; No.11, p.7

Arab nationalism, No.1, p.10

Arafah, Musa, No.2, p.15

Arkhipov, I.V., No.2, p.14

Arsharuni, N.A., No.11, p.6

Arzumanyan, A., No.4, p.3

Aswan High Dam, No.2, pp.14-15; No.3, p.16; No.5, p.9; No.8, p.12; No.9, pp.22-3

Ataturk, Kemal, No.3, p.17

Atsamba, F.M., No.4, pp.5-8

Avakov, R., No.2, pp.2 and 4-5

Awolowo, Obafemi, No.11, pp.23 and 25-6

Azadi, A., No.2, p.16

Azembski, M., No.9, pp.18-19

Azikiwe, Nnamdi, No.11, pp.23-4

Baghdad Pact (see CENTO), No.3, pp.10-15; No.10, p.14; No.11, p.15

Bakdash, Khalid, No.1, p.11; No.7, p.5; No.9, p.21; No.10, pp.12-14; No.11, pp.5, 16 and 18

Balabushevich, V.V., No.1, p.20

Balafrej, Ahmad, No.2, pp.8-9

Balewa, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa, No.11, pp.23, 25 and 29

Baranov, A., No.6, p.27

Basrah Petroleum Company, No.5, p.6

Ba'th Party, No.1, p.7

Belgium, No.2, pp.19-20 and 22-3; No.3, pp.30-3; No.7, pp.29-30

Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (September 1961), No.7, p.9; No.8, pp.1-2

Bella, Ben, No.11, p.35

Belyayev, I., No.3, pp.27 and 36; No.4, p.20; No.6, p.1; No.7, pp.5-6 and 10; No.8, p.29; No.9, p.22; No.11, pp. 4 and 31

Ben Gurion, No.1, p.11; No.10, p.16; No.11, p.11

Bochkarev, Yuri, No.2, p.8; No.3, pp.2 and 21; No.5, p.21

Bragin, N., No.5, p.12

Braginskiy, M.I., No.1, pp.15 and 18; No.2, p.13; No.6, pp.18-19 and 22

Brezhnev, Leonid, No.3, pp.28-9; No.11, pp.20-1 and 31-2

Britain, No.1, pp.16-17; No.2, p.16; No.3, pp.18-27 and 35; No.4, pp.10 and 20-1; No.5, pp.13-22; No.11, pp.7, 13 and 22-9

Buhali, Larbi, No.9, pp.4-5; No.10, p.17; No.11, p.34

Bustani, Emile, No.6, p.14

Casablanca Conference, No.1, p.23; No.2, p.21

CENTO, No.5, p.11; No.8, pp.12-14; No.9, pp.23-4; No.10, p.16; No.11, pp.12-13 and 15

Central African Republic, No.8, pp.31-2; No.9, pp.11 and 19

Chad, No.9, pp.10 and 16

Chechetkina, O., No.5, p.23

Christianity in Africa, No.7, pp.16-23

Classes in Africa, No.6, pp.18-23; No.11, p.30

Common Market, No.8, pp.15-21

Communist Parties, No.1, pp.2-4; No.4, pp.1-4; No.6, pp.17-18; No.7, pp.1-4; No.10, p.7

Algerian, No.6, p.28; No.9, pp.2-7; No.10, p.17; No.11, pp.34-5

Egyptian, No.2, p.15

(Communist Parties - continued)

French, No.2, pp.2 and 23; No.6, p.27

Iraqi, No.1, pp.8-9; No.3, pp.2-6; No.5, p.6; No.7, p.4; No.8, p.12; No.10, pp.14-16; No.11, pp.5-6

Israeli, No.6, p.11; No.10, pp.16-17; No.11, pp.10-11

Jordanian, No.1, p.11; No.4, pp.1-4; No.11, pp.9-10

Lebanese, No.1, p.11; No.2, p.16; No.6, pp.9-10; No.10, p.14; No.11, pp.3 and 9

Moroccan, No.2, pp.2-6 and 8; No.8, p.30; No.10, pp.17-18

South African, No.1, p.17; No.6, p.30

Sudanese, No.3, p.27; No.10, pp.18-19

Syrian, No.1, p.11; No.6, pp.4 and 9; No.7, pp.4-5; No.8, p.12; No.9, p.21; No.10, pp.12-14; No.11, pp.3-5 and 16-18

Tunisian, No.10, p.18

Turkish, No.10, p.16; No.11, p.13

Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Draft Programme and the Afro-Asian Countries, No.10, pp.1-11

Congo (Brazzaville), No.8, p.32; No.9, p.30

Congo (Leopoldville), No.1, pp.15 and 23-5; No.2, pp.18-23; No.3, pp.29-34; No.4, pp.16-19; No.5, pp.26-8; No.6, pp.26-7; No.7, pp.30-1; No.8, pp.22-3; No.9, pp.26-8; No.11, pp.29 and 33-4

Convention People's Party (Ghana), No.10, p.20

Cyprus, No.5, pp.11-12; No.7, p.15; No.8, p.14; No.10, p.17; No.11, p.21

Dahomey, No.2, pp.24-5

Dantsig, B.M., No.7, p.7

Dayal, Rajeshwar, No.2, p.22

Demchenko, P., No.1, p.6; No.2, p.3; No.3, pp.3 and 8-9; No.4, p.9; No.7, p.9; No.11, pp.6, 8-9, 17 and 20

Dement'yev, Yu., No.9, pp.13-14

Demir, Yakub, No.10, p.16

Democratic Party of Guinea, No.10, p.19

Diallo, Saifoulaye, No.10, p.19

Dmitrevskiy, Yu.D., No.3, pp.18-22

Donskoy, P., No.8, pp.5-7; No.11, p.6

Drachinskiy, N., No.11, p.31

Efirov, S., No.7, pp.16 and 20-2

Egypt (see also UAR) No.3, pp.24-5; No.4, pp.4-8; No.10, pp.12-13

Eichmann, No.5, p.10; No.6, p.10; No.8, p.12; No.11, p.12

Emami, Sharif, No.11, p.14

Entente States, No.5, pp.29-30

Ethiopia, No.1, p.28; No.2, p.24; No.5, pp.13-21; No.6, p.28; No.11, p.36

Etinger, Ya., No.8, p.17

Eurafrica, No.8, pp.15-21

Fedorenko, V.M., No.6, pp.3-4

Fedorova, N.G., No.2, p.13

Fedyashin, G., No.3, p.33; No.4, p.19; No.5, p.27; No.6, p.26; No.9, p.28; No.11, pp.33-4

Filippov, N., No.4, pp.20-1

Fil'shtinskiy, S.Ye., No.8, p.18

FLN (Algeria), No.2, p.23; No.6, p.27; No.9, pp.2 and 5-6; No.10, p.11

France, No.1, pp.16-17 and 26-7; No.2, pp.3 and 23-5; No.3, p.34; No.4, pp.21-2; No.5, pp.25-6; No.6, p.27; No.7, pp.31-2; No.8, pp.16-17 and 28-30; No.9, pp.1-7 and 9-20; No.11, p.35

Gabon, No.5, p.30

Gafurov, B., No.4, pp.12-13

Gavrilov, N., No.1, pp.15-17; No.6, pp.23-4; No.9, pp.12-13

Gavrilov, Yu., No.4, p.23

Genin, I., No.7, p.8

Gerasimov, I.P., No.9, pp.11-12

Germany, Western, No.5, p.10; No.8, pp.16-18; No.11, p.12

Ghana, No.1, p.29; No.2, p.23; No.3, p.29; No.4, p.23; No.5, p.30; No.6, p.29; No.7, pp.33-4; No.8, pp.23-6; No.9, pp.30-1; No.10, pp.11 and 20

Gizenga, Antoine, No.1, pp.23-4; No.2, pp.20 and 22; No.3, pp.30 and 33; No.4, pp.17 and 19; No.5, pp.26-7; No.6, p.26; No.7, pp.29-30; No.8, pp.22-3; No.11, p.33

Goldobin, A.M., No.3, p.20

Goncharov, A., No.8, pp.17 and 20-1

Goroshkin, P., No.5, p.11

Gostev, M., No.11, pp.22 and 25

Grigor'yev, Y., No.5, p.13

Guinea, No.1, p.29; No.2, p.25; No.3, pp.28-9; No.5, p.29; No.7, p.33; No.9, pp.10-12 and 30; No.10, pp.3, 11 and 19; No.11, p.36

Gukasyan-Gandzaketsi, L.G., No.8, pp.15 and 18-19

Gursel, Gen. Cemal, No.1, p.12; No.4, p.10; No.5, p.11; No.11, pp.12 and 20

Hammarskjoeld, Dag, No.1, p.25; No.2, pp.19-20 and 22; No.3, pp.29-34; No.4, pp.16-19; No.5, pp.26-7; No.8, pp.22-3 and 28; No.9, pp.27-8; No.11, p.34

Harmal, Muhammad, No.10, p.18

Houphouet-Boigny, President (Ivory Coast), No.4, p.23; No.9, pp.17-18

Husayn, King, No.11, p.10

ICFTU, No.1, pp.14 and 19; No.3, p.36; No.6, p.24; No.9, p.8; No.11, p.28

Ikhwan, No.6, pp.1-3

Imami, Sharif, No.2, p.16; No.4, p.10

Inonu, Ismet, No.11, p.20

Iordanskiy, V., No.4, p.23; No.9, p.31

Irandust, A., No.2, p.17; No.3, pp.10-15

Iraq, No.1, pp.5-11; No.3, pp.2-10 and 16; No.4, pp.8-9; No.5, pp.1-9; No.7, pp.5-9; No.8, pp.5-7 and 13; No.10, pp.4 and 14-16; No.11, pp.5-7 and 19

relations with UAR, No.1, pp.7-8

relations with USSR, No.2, p.16; No.3, pp.2-6; No.4, pp.8-9; No.5, pp.1-7; No.6, p.10; No.9, p.23

Iraq Petroleum Company, No.5, pp.3 and 6; No.7, p.6

Islam, No.2, p.17

Ismagilova, R., No.2, p.14

Isma'il, Abd al-Qadir, No.3, p.3

Israel, No.1, pp.11-12; No.5, p.10; No.6, pp.10-11; No.7, p.10; No.8 p.12; No.10, pp.16-17; No.11, pp.10-12 and 20

Istiqlal Party (Morocco), No.2, pp.2-8

Italy, No.5, pp.14-15

Ittihad, Ash-Sha'b, No.3, p.3; No.5, pp.3 and 6; No.11, pp.5-6

Ivanov, K., No.2, p.22; No.5, p.26; No.7, p.29

Ivanov, L., No.9, p.16

Ivanov, N.A., No.2, p.3

Ivanova, Ye., No.6, p.24

Ivory Coast, No.4, p.23; No.7, p.35; No.9, pp.10 and 17-19

Izakov, B., No.9, pp.27-8

Jawad, Hashim, No.1, p.11

Jews and Judaism, No.11, pp.10-11

Jordan, No.4, pp.1-4; No.10, p.16; No.11, pp.9-10

Kalinin, N., No.2, pp.15-16

Kalinina, I.K., No.2, p.16

Kalonji, No.3, p.30

Kamitatu, No.3, p.31; No.4, p.19

Karpushina, V.Ya., No.2, p.14

Kasatkin, D., No.7, p.10

Kasavubu, Joseph, No.4, pp.16 and 18-19

Kassis, V., No.6, p.13

Katanga Province, No.1, pp.24-5; No.2, pp.20 and 23; No.8, p.23; No.9, pp.26-8; No.11, pp.33-4

Katin, V., No.3, pp.7-8

Katsman, V.Ya., No.6, pp.18-20 and 22

Keita, Modibo, No.5, p.29

Kenya, No.1, p.28; No.3, p.35; No.4, p.24; No.5, p.31; No.8, p.32; No.10, p.2

Kenyatta, Jomo, No.3, p.35; No.8, p.32

Khaniqin Oil Company, No.5, pp.1 and 4

Khar'kov, V., No.9, p.27

Kheddah, Ben, No.11, p.35

Khokhlov, N., No.3, p.30; No.6, p.26; No.7, pp.23 and 30-1; No.8, p.22; No.11, pp.31 and 33-4

Khrushchev, N.S., No.1, pp.5, 11, 22, 24 and 26-9; No.2, pp.8-9, 18 and 24-5; No.3, pp.14, 28-9 and 35-6; No.4, pp.8, 10, 15-17, 20 and 23; No.5, pp.9, 18, 22-3 and 28-30; No.7, pp.1, 9 and 29-30; No.8, pp.1-2 and 23-8; No.9, pp.1-2, 23 and 29-30; No.10, pp.2-5 and 8-9; No.11, pp.2-3, 5, 19-20 and 35

Kim, L., No.11, pp.22, 25-7 and 30

Kiselev, V.I., No.3, pp.18-19 and 22-7

Kolesnichenko, T., No.4, p.19; No.5, p.27; No.6, p.26; No.8, p.23; No.11, p.33

Komzin, I., No.3, p.15

Kondrashov, S., No.1, pp.2 and 23; No.3, pp.26-7; No.5, pp.21-3; No.6, p.23; No.7, p.9

Koreyten, Hasan, No.1, p.11

Kostrov, A., No.6, pp.10-11

Kotlov, L.N., No.1, p.7; No.7, pp.7-8

Kravchenko, I., No.7, pp.16 and 20-2

Kruglov, L.L., No.8, p.16

Krymskiy, V., No.7, p.10

Kubbah, Ibrahim, No.1, p.10

Kublitskiy, G.I., No.1, p.8

Kudrayavtsev, V., No.5, p.22; No.7, p.35

Kupalova, I.P., No.2, p.12

Kurds, No.10, p.15; No.11, p.7

Kuwait, No.7, pp.5-8; No.11, p.7

Kuzbari, Ma'mun al-, No.9, p.20

Kuznetsov, N., No.4, p.19

Kuznetsov, Yu., No.7, p.15

Kweah, Ebenezer Cephas, No.10, p.20

Landa, R.G., No.9, pp.4-5

Lavrent'yev, A.K., No.8, pp.8-11

Lavretskiy, I.P., No.7, pp.18 and 20-1

Lebanon, No.2, p.16; No.4, pp.9-10; No.5, p.9; No.6, pp.9-10; No.7, p.10; No.10, pp.11 and 14; No.11, pp.8-9 and 20

Levin, Z.I., No.7, pp.7-8

Libya, No.1, p.27; No.4, p.22; No.5, pp.28-9; No.6, p.28

Lumumba, Patrice, No.1, pp.23 and 25; No.2, pp.20-2; No.3, pp.29 and 31-4; No.4, pp.16-19; No.8, pp.22-3

Lundula, Gen., No.1, p.25; No.4, p.19; No.9, p.27; No.11, p.23

Lutskaya, N.S., No.2, pp.2-4 and 6

Lutskiy, V.B., No.4, p.13

Lyubarskaya, A.M., No.1, p.20

Lyudkovskaya, N.S., No.2, pp.12-13

Mahdawi, Fadil Abbas al-, No.3, p.5

Mali Republic, No.4, pp.22-3; No.5, p.29; No.6, p.29; No.8, p.31; No.9, pp.10, 12-15 and 30; No.10, pp.11 and 20; No.11, p.36

Malta, No.6, p.13

Maltsev, O., No.9, p.15

Malykin, Ya., No.11, p.15

Martynov, V.A., No.1, p.16; No.4, p.18

Matni, Nasib, No.5, p.7

Matus, N., No.3, p.17

Mauritania, No.3, p.28; No.10, p.17

Mayevskiy, V., No.2, p.22; No.5, p.24; No.8, pp.3-5 and 22; No.9, p.22; No.11, p.4

Mboya, Tom, No.1, p.19; No.5, p.22

Menderes, No.9, p.24; No.11, pp.13-14

Mikhaylov, M., No.5, p.25

Mikoyan, A.I., No.1, pp.5-6

Mikunis, Samuel, No.10, pp.16-17; No.11, p.12

Milovanov, I., No.1, pp.5-7 and 9

Mirskiy, G., No.11, p.15

Misyugin, V.M., No.2, p.12

Miterev, G.A., No.3, p.34

Mobutu, No.1, pp.23-5; No.2, pp.19-22; No.3, pp.30-1 and 33; No.11, p.33

Molchanov, V.G., No.5, pp.13 and 20

Morocco, No.2, pp.2-9 and 23-4; No.3, pp.28 and 35; No.5, p.28; No.7, p.33; No.8, p.30; No.9, pp.7-10 and 29; No.10, pp.11 and 17-18; No.11, p.36

Mosaddeq, No.2, p.17; No.6, pp.12-13; No.8, pp.7-11; No.10, p.16; No.11, p.15

Mozambique, No.4, p.20

Mulele, Pierre, No.1, p.24

Musakhanov, M.M., No.3, p.4

Mustafa, Ibrahim, No.10, pp.18-19

Myachina, Ye.N., No.2, pp.12-13

Nasir, Jamal Abd an-, No.1, pp.10 and 23; No.2, pp.15 and 22; No.4, p.8; No.8, pp.3-4; No.9, p.20; No.10, pp.11 and 14; No.11, pp.2, 4, 16-17 and 19

Nassar, Fuad, No.1, p.11; No.4, pp.1-4; No.10, p.16; No.11, p.9

"National Bourgeoisie", No.1, pp.3-4, 9 and 18; No.3, p.2; No.4, pp.2-3; No.5, p.18; No.6, pp.15-16 and 18-19; No.8, pp.8-11; No.9, p.4; No.10, p.6; No.11, p.27

National Democracy, No.7, pp.1-2

National Liberation Movement, No.10, pp.2-8; No.11, p.8

Nationalism, African, No.6, pp.15-17

NATO, No.3, pp.16-17; No.9, pp.23-4; No.11, pp.11-13 and 20

Nehru, Pandit, No.4, pp.16-17

Niger, No.2, p.24; No.8, p.31

Nigeria, No.1, p.29; No.4, p.24; No.6, p.29; No.7, p.34; No.8, p.30; No.9, p.31; No.10, p.1; No.11, pp.22-31

Nkomo, Joshua, No.1, p.29

Nkrumah, Dr. Kwame, No.1, p.19; No.3, p.29; No.4, p.23; No.6, p.29; No.7, p.33; No.8, pp.1 and 23-6; No.9, pp.30-1

Northern Rhodesia, No.3, pp.35-6; No.10, p.1

Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party, No.10, p.1

Nosov, F., No.2, p.18

Nutting, Anthony, No.3, p.2

Nyasaland, No.1, p.29; No.8, p.32

Oil, Middle East, No.5, pp.1-7 and 16; No.6, p.14; No.8, pp.7-11; No.9, p.25; No.11, pp.6-8

(See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Iraq Petroleum Company, Basrah Petroleum Company, Khaniqin Oil Company)

Okhotina, N.V., No.2, pp.12-13

Okpara, Michael, No.11, p.25

Ol'derogge, D.A., No.2, pp.11-12; No.5, p.29

Olympio, Sylvanus, No.2, p.24; No.9, p.19

Orestov, Oleg, No.1, p.29; No.3, pp.28 and 35; No.5, p.30; No.7, p.23; No.9, pp.30-1; No.11, pp.22-6 and 29-30

Oriental Studies, Soviet, No.4, pp.4-5

Orientalists' Congress (Moscow, 1960), No.4, p.14

Orlova, A.S., No.2, p.13; No.6, pp.18 and 20-2

Osenev, N., No.4, p.17

Osipov, No.4, p.20; No.5, p.30

Paklin, N., No.9, p.10

Papaioannou, Ezekias, No.10, p.17

Pegin, G., No.3, p.35

Penchenko, I., No.1, p.20; No.4, p.8; No.9, pp.8-9

Pershits, A.I., No.6, p.1; No.11, p.8

Persia, No.1, pp.12-13; No.2, pp.16-17; No.5, p.11; No.6, pp.12-13; No.7, pp.10-13; No.8, pp.7-11 and 13-14; No.9, p.24; No.10, p.16; No.11, pp.14-16 and 21

relations with USSR, No.2, p.17; No.3, pp.10-15; No.4, p.10; No.5, p.11; No.7, pp.12-13; No.8, p.11; No.9, p.24; No.11, p.14

Persian-Soviet Treaty of 1921, No.3, pp.11-13; No.4, p.10

Plashevskiy, Yu., No.1, p.12

Plotnikov, Yu., No.9, p.23; No.11, p.13

Plyshevskiy, I.P., No.7, p.5

Ponomarev, B., No.7, p.2

Popov, V., No.7, p.13

Popov, Yu., No.3, p.35

Portugal, No.3, p.36; No.6, p.25; No.7, p.29; No.9, p.26

Portuguese Africa, No.3, p.36; No.4, pp.19-20; No.5, p.28; No.6, pp.25-6; No.7, pp.29-30

Potekhin, I.I., No.1, pp.14 and 16-19; No.2, pp.10 and 13; No.3, p.25; No.4, pp.11-16 and 18 and Supp., pp.1-19; No.5, p.14; No.6, pp.18 and 22; No.7, pp.17 and 23; No.9, pp.7 and 31; No.10, p.1; No.11, p.34

Potemkin, Yu., No.1, p.19; No.2, pp.3-8; No.9, p.8

Primakov, Ye., No.6, p.1; No.7, p.7

Proshin, N.I., No.6, pp.1-3

Prozhogin, N., No.1, p.25; No.4, pp.18-19; No.5, p.28; No.8, p.28; No.9, p.29

Pulavskiy, V., No.11, pp.22 and 24

Pykhtunov, N., No.9, p.19

Qasim, Abd al-Karim, No.1, p.9; No.3, pp.2-6; No.5, pp.2 and 6; No.11, pp.5, 7 and 19

Rachkov, B., No.6, p.14; No.9; p.25

Radchenko, G., No.9, p.14

Radmanesh, Reza, No.10, p.16

Ratiani, G., No.3, p.34; No.4, p.21

Reform Party of the Working People of Cyprus (Akel), No.10, p.17

Religion, No.2, p.17; No.7, pp.16-23; No.9, p.30; No.11, p.9

Rhodesia, No.1, p.29; No.3, pp.35-6; No.8, p.32

Rikhye, Gen., No.3, pp.29-30

Ruanda-Urundi, No.2, pp.19 and 22-3

Rubinskiy, Y., No.8, pp.18-19

Rybakov, V., No.11, pp.22-4

Sahara, No.1, p.27

Salumu, Bernard, No.1, p.23

Samantar, Yusuf Osman, No.4, p.24

Samylovskiy, I., No.7, pp.3-4

Sa'ud, Ibn, No.6, pp.1-3; No.11, pp.8 and 19

Saudi Arabia, No.1, p.11; No.4, p.9; No.5, p.10; No.6, pp.1-3; No.11, pp.8 and 19

Sedov, M., No.1, p.20

Selassie, Haile, No.5, pp.13-17

Semenov, V.S., No.3, p.36

Senegal, No.4, p.23; No.5, p.29; No.6, pp.28-9; No.8, p.31; No.9, pp.10 and 12-16

Serebryannikov, R., No.11, p.36

Seyful'-Mulyukov, F.M., No.1, pp.5-8

Sharayev, V.I., No.2, p.13

Sharevskaya, B.I., No.2, p.13; No.7, pp.17-20 and 22

Shawi, Nikola, No.10, p.14

Sheynis, Z., No.11, p.10

Shukr, Ali, No.3, p.4; No.4, pp.7-8; No.7, p.4

Sidenko, V., No.1, p.18; No.9, pp.15 and 17-18

Sierra Leone, No.5, p.30

Sivolobov, A.M., No.6, pp.15-17

Skorov, G., No.4, p.13; No.8, pp.15-19; No.9, p.4

Smirnov, K., No.2, p.22; No.6, p.27

Smirnov, S.R., No.2, p.12; No.3, pp.18-19 and 24-5

Sobchenko, A.I., No.2, p.12

Somalia, No.2, p.24; No.4, p.24; No.5, p.31; No.6, p.28; No.7, p.35; No.8, p.32

South Africa, No.1, p.17; No.4, pp.20-1; No.5, pp.31-2; No.6, pp.29-30; No.9, p.26

Strel'nikov, B., No.3, p.33

Stroganova, I.P., No.2, p.12

Stupak, A., No.1, pp.5 and 9; No.7, p.13

Sudan, No.1, p.27; No.2, p.24; No.3, pp.18-27; No.6, p.28; No.8, pp.27-8; No.10, pp.11 and 18-19; No.11, pp.31-2

Svanidze, I.A., No.2, p.13

Syria, No.6, pp.3-5; No.9, pp.20-2; No.10, pp.9 and 11-14; No.11, pp.3-5 and 16-19

Tanganyika, No.5, p.31

Timberlake, No.3, p.31

Togo, No.2, p.24; No.7, p.34; No.8, p.31; No.9, pp.11 and 19-20

Tokareva, Z., No.9, pp.19-20

Tokmakchi, Hafiz, No.1, p.10

Tolstov, S.P., No.4, p.11

Tomilin, Yu., No.1, p.28; No.5, pp.17-18

Toure, Sekou, No.1, p.19; No.2, p.25; No.3, p.28; No.5, p.29; No.6, p.24

Trade Unions, No.1, pp.9 and 14-21; No.2, p.4; No.3, pp.2-6, 23 and 35; No.5, pp.7-8 and 24; No.6, pp.3-5 and 23-4; No.7, pp.3 and 33; No.9, pp.7-10; No.11, pp.5, 14 and 27-9

Traore, Tidiani, No.10, p.20; No.11, p.36

Trubintsyn, V., No.9, p.6

Tshombe, Moise, No.1, p.24; No.3, pp.30-1 and 33; No.4, pp.16-19; No.6, pp.26-7; No.8, pp.22-3; No.9, pp.26-8; No.11, p.33

Tudeh Party, No.8, pp.8 and 10; No.10, p.16

Tunisia, No.2, p.24; No.7, p.32; No.8, pp.28-30; No.9, p.29; No.10, pp.11 and 18

Turchaninov, D., No.11, pp.22 and 27

Turk, Riyad at-, No.6, p.9, No.11, p.3

Turkey, No.1, pp.12-13; No.2, p.16; No.3, pp.16-17; No.4, p.10; No.5, pp.11-12; No.6, pp.11-12; No.7, pp.13-15; No.8, pp.13-14; No.9, pp.23-4; No.10, p.16; No.11, pp.12-14 and 20-1

Tursun-Zade, M., No.2, p.18

Tyutryumova, T.L., No.2, pp.12-13

U-2, No.3, p.16

UAR, No.1, pp.10-11; No.2, pp.14-16; No.3, pp.6-10 and 15-16; No.4, pp.4-8; No.6, pp.3-10; No.7, pp.4-5 and 9-10; No.8, pp.3-5 and 11-12; No.9, pp.20-3; No.10, pp.4 and 11-13; No.11, pp.2-4 and 19

anti-Communism in, No.1, p.7; No.2, p.15; No.3, p.16; No.6, pp.5-8; No.7, pp.1-2; No.11, pp.2-3

relations with USSR, No.1, p.11; No.2, pp.14-16; No.4, p.8; No.5, p.8; No.6, pp.5-8; No.11, pp.2-3 and 19

Uganda, No.1, p.28

Ugtan, No.1, pp.17 and 20-1

Union Soudanaise, No.10, p.20

United Nations, No.1, pp.10-11 and 26; No.11, p.29

and the Congo (Leopoldville), No.1, pp.24-5; No.2, pp.18-23; No.3, pp.29-34; No.4, pp.16-19; No.5, pp.26-7; No.6, p.26; No.7, p.30; No.8, pp.22-3; No.9, pp.26-8; No.11, pp.33-4

Declaration on Independence for Colonial Peoples, No.1, p.22; No.2, p.18; No.9, p.26

Economic Commission for Africa, No.3, pp.36-7

Angola, No.4, pp.19-20; No.6, p.25

Upper Volta, No.2, pp.24-5; No.9, pp.10 and 17

USA, No.1, pp.26 and 28; No.2, pp.23-4; No.3, pp.10-17; No.4, pp.9, 18 and 24; No.5, pp.9-10, 13-21, 25 and 29; No.8, p.18; No.11, pp.8-15, 23, 26 and 36

Vasil'yev, I., No.5, p.8

Vasil'yeva, V.Ya., No.1, p.14; No.2, p.4

Vatolina, L.N., No.9, p.4

Verin, V., No.9, p.17

Verwoerd, Dr., No.4, p.20; No.5, p.32

Viktorov, L., No.1, p.7

Voblikov, D.P., No.1, p.18; No.5, pp.15-19

Volk, S., No.9, pp.15-16

Vologdina, V., No.2, p.14

Voloshin, F., No.1, p.7

Vol'skiy, D., No.1, pp.15-18

Wahhabi movement, No.6, pp.1-2

WFTU, No.1, p.21; No.2, p.4; No.3, pp.4-5 and 23; No.5, p.24; No.11, pp.5 and 28

Workers' movements, No.1, p.16; No.4, pp.4-8

Yakovleva, I.P., No.2, pp.12-13

Yastrebova, D.R., No.4, p.13

Yata, Ali, No.10, pp.17-18

Yemen, No.2, p.16; No.4, p.9; No.5, pp.9-10; No.11, p.20

Yermolayev, A., No.2, p.16

Yur'yev, G., No.3, p.26

Yushmanov, N.V., No.2, p.12

Zakariyah, Ibrahim, No.1, p.21

Zanzibar, No.7, pp.35-6

Zhukov, G.A., No.1, p.11

Zhukov, Ye., No.1, pp.3-4

Zionism, No.11, pp.10-11

Zusmanovich, A.Z., No.1, p.14

Zykov, S., No.1, p.26; No.3, p.31; No.4, p.21; No.6, pp.28-9; No.7, p.31; No.9, pp.28-9

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